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THE END OF THE WAR ON DRUGS,
THE PEACE DIVIDEND AND THE
RENEWED FOURTH AMENDMENT?
MICHAEL VITIELLO*
I. Introduction
The War on Drugs profoundly eroded the Fourth Amendment.1 D.C.
Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Harry T. Edwards summed it up in the
midst of the War when he expressed his “growing concern about the degree
to which individual rights and liberties appear to be falling victim to the
Government’s ‘War on Drugs.’”2
Scholars have identified many areas where the Supreme Court cut back
Fourth Amendment protections as part of the War on Drugs. For instance,
the Court has treated the drug-detection dog sniff as “sui generis” and
correspondingly refused to recognize such a sniff as a search at all, despite
its clear purpose to detect evidence of criminal activity.3 Additionally, the
Court has found that police do not engage in Fourth Amendment activity
when they fly over a suspect’s property, even when that overflight allows
officers to peer into areas within a home’s curtilage that the homeowner
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of
Law; University of Pennsylvania, J.D., 1974; Swarthmore College, B.A., 1969. I would like
to thank my research assistants Joanne Gothard and Cameron Graber for their excellent help
with this Article.
1. There is much to support the notion that the War on Drugs, in general, is largely
responsible for the current state of search-and-seizure law. See, e.g., Susan F. Mandiberg,
Marijuana Prohibition and the Shrinking of the Fourth Amendment, 43 MCGEORGE L. REV.
23, 23–24 (2012); see also Thomas Regnier, The “Loyal Foot Soldier”: Can the Fourth
Amendment Survive the Supreme Court’s War on Drugs?, 72 UMKC L. REV. 631, 649–64
(2004); David Rudovsky, The Impact of the War on Drugs on Procedural Fairness and
Racial Equality, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 237, 240; Diane-Michele Krasnow, To Stop the
Scourge: The Supreme Court’s Approach to the War on Drugs, 19 AM. J. CRIM. L. 219, 221
(1992); Christian J. Rowley, Note, Florida v. Bostick: The Fourth Amendment—Another
Casualty of the War on Drugs, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 601, 603; Steven K. Bernstein, Note,
Fourth Amendment—Using the Drug Courier Profile to Fight to War on Drugs, 80 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 996, 1017 (1990); Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging ‘Drug
Exception’ to the Bill of Rights, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 889, 890 (1987); Stephen A. Saltzburg,
Another Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (as Illustrated by the Open
Fields Doctrine), 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1986).
2. Hartness v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170, 174 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
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sought to exclude from the public’s view.4 The Court has also upheld
consent searches under circumstances that defy credibility, for example,
where a defendant would be able to drive away without more than a traffic
ticket, but consents to a search leading to evidence that puts him away for
years in prison.5 At the height of the War on Drugs, the Court extended the
scope of a vehicle search-incident-to-a-lawful arrest to the entire passenger
compartment, including closed containers within the vehicle.6 While, for a
time, the Court seemed ready to declare some traffic offenses so trivial that
the Fourth Amendment prohibited a custodial arrest,7 the Court rejected
such a rule.8 Oddly enough, the Court has held that the Fourth Amendment
does not outlaw a custodial arrest even when an officer erroneously
believes that he has authority to make that arrest.9 The Court’s
unwillingness to allow a defendant to inquire into whether a traffic stop was
pretextual at a suppression hearing also contributes to the erosion of Fourth
Amendment protections.10
The list goes on and on. Notice, however, the ability of the police to stop
virtually anyone on the highway and to escalate the encounter into a search
based on slim, if any, justification.11 Because citizens lack the ability to
4. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476
U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
5. See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 249–50 (1991); see also Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35–36 (1996) (upholding consent search where driver was not even
ticketed).
6. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981); see also Thornton v. United States,
541 U.S. 615, 623–24 (2004) (extending the Belton search rule to situations where the
arrestee is a “recent occupant” of a car).
7. See Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266–67 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(“[A] persuasive claim might have been made . . . that the custodial arrest of the petitioner
for a minor traffic offense violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments.”); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 237–38, 238 n.2 (1973) (Powell,
J., concurring) (describing the validity of custodial arrest for minor traffic violations as not
“self-evident”).
8. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001) (upholding custodial
arrest instigated by minor traffic violation without any other criminal evidence).
9. Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008).
10. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814–15 (1996).
11. See, e.g., Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 395 (2014) (upholding the
reasonable suspicion required to pull a motorist over based solely on an anonymous 911 call
that claimed a Ford pickup with a particular license number “[r]an the reporting party off the
roadway”); see also K.K. Rebecca Lai et al., Assessing the Legality of Sandra Bland’s
Arrest, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/07/20/us/
sandra-bland-arrest-death-videos-maps.html.
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challenge a stop as pretextual, officers can base stops on racial profiling
largely with impunity.12 In light of such an eroded Fourth Amendment, it is
unsurprising that minority men represent a disproportionate number of drug
defendants in the criminal justice system.13
The emergence of a broad political consensus has helped bring a truce—
and perhaps an end to—the War on Drugs.14 Many states have reduced
prison populations, often by changing policies concerning the incarceration
of drug offenders.15 At the federal level, the First Step Act—an unusual

12. Drivers subjected to pretextual stops may still raise Equal Protection claims. Whren,
517 U.S. at 813. The Court’s Equal Protection jurisprudence coupled with Whren itself,
however, leaves little hope that officers would be deterred in any way by the possibility of
an Equal Protection suit, or that the drivers themselves will be vindicated. See Herring v.
United States, 555 U.S. 135, 153 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The exclusionary rule, it
bears emphasis, is often the only remedy effective to redress a Fourth Amendment
violation.”) (citations omitted); see also David O. Markus, Whren v. United States: A
Pretext to Subvert the Fourth Amendment, 14 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 91, 104–06 (1998).
13. See Michael Vitiello, Marijuana Legalization, Racial Disparity, and the Hope for
Reform, 23 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 790 (2019); Douglas A. Berman, Reminders of
Realities of Marijuana Arrest Rates, L. PROFESSOR BLOGS NETWORK: MARIJUANA L., POL’Y
& REFORM (July 8, 2018), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/marijuana_law/2018/07/
reminders-of-realities-of-marijuana-arrest-rates.html; ASHLEY NELLIS, SENTENCING PROJECT,
THE COLOR OF JUSTICE: RACIAL AND ETHICAL DISPARITY IN STATE PRISONS (2016),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/The-Color-of-JusticeRacial-and-Ethnic-Disparity-in-State-Prisons.pdf. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE
NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (rev. ed. 2012).
14. See Christopher J. Coyne & Abigail R. Hall, Four Decades and Counting: The
Continued Failure of the War on Drugs, CATO INST. (Apr. 12, 2017), https://www.cato.org/
publications/policy-analysis/four-decades-counting-continued-failure-war-drugs
(“[Drug]
prohibition is not only ineffective, but counterproductive, at achieving the goals of
policymakers both domestically and abroad.”); see also Johann Hari, Op-Ed: The Old
Global Consensus on the War on Drugs Is Crumbling, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2016, 5:00
AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0410-hari-un-drug-rebellion-20160410story.html; America’s New Drug Policy Landscape, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 2, 2014),
https://www.people-press.org/2014/04/02/americas-new-drug-policy-landscape/ (providing a
public opinion polling showing, inter alia, two-thirds of Americans favor treatment over
incarceration for non-violent drug offenses).
15. See DENNIS SCHRANTZ, STEPHEN T. DEBOR & MARC MAUER, SENTENCING PROJECT,
DECARCERATION STRATEGIES: HOW 5 STATES ACHIEVED SUBSTANTIAL PRISON POPULATION
REDUCTIONS
(2018),
https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/
Decarceration-Strategies.pdf.
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moment of bipartisanship in a dysfunctional Congress16—signals
exhaustion with the War. This shifting attitude may be driving real change,
as one Pew Research Center report suggests that racial disparity in our
prison systems has lessened in recent years.17
If the War is over or ending, will the Court breathe life back into the
Fourth Amendment? Judge Edwards raised the question in 1990, when he
stated, “[W]hen the war is over, we find that departures from constitutional
norms, legitimized by the courts, have lasting and wide-ranging effects.
Constitutional principles, once abandoned, are not easily reclaimed.”18 This
article explores the future of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in the face
of the waning war.
Indeed, we may be reclaiming Fourth Amendment protections. In 2009,
the Court examined the scope of a vehicle search based on a lawful arrest.19
Arizona v. Gant revived a more careful analysis, tying the scope of
legitimate police conduct to the underlying rationale that made such
conduct reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.20 Three
years later, the Supreme Court confronted how the Fourth Amendment
should apply in an era of expanded data collection.21 In a series of recent
cases, the Court seems ready to articulate a new paradigm in cases

16. Jamiles Lartey, Trump Signs Bipartisan Criminal Justice Overhaul First Step Act
into Law, GUARDIAN (Dec. 21, 2018, 7:12 PM GMT), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/dec/21/trump-prison-reform-first-step-act-signed-law.
17. See John Gramlich, The Gap Between the Number of Blacks and Whites in Prison Is
Shrinking, PEW RES. CTR. (Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/04/
30/shrinking-gap-between-number-of-blacks-and-whites-in-prison/ (“[A] significant decline
in the number of black prisoners has steadily narrowed the gap over the past decade,
according to new data from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.”).
18. Hartness v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting).
19. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009).
20. See id. at 351 (“Police may search a vehicle incident to [lawful arrest] only if the
arrestee is in reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. When these
justifications are absent, a search of an arrestee’s vehicle will be unreasonable unless police
obtain a warrant or show that another exception to the warrant requirement applies.”).
21. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012) (analyzing “whether the
attachment of a Global–Positioning–System (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s
vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public
streets, constitutes a search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”). See
generally Michael Vitiello, Katz v. United States: Back to the Future?, 52 U. RICH. L. REV.
425 (2018).
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involving technology.22 Those cases suggest the Court’s willingness to
rethink its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.23
This article focuses on some specific Fourth Amendment issues that have
arisen in states where voters have legalized marijuana for medical and/or
recreational use. Since California adopted its medical marijuana law, its
courts have shown little interest in extending Fourth Amendment
protection, even in situations where suspects have medical marijuana
authorization.24 Most courts, even in states that legalized marijuana for
medical use, concluded that an officer observing a suspect in possession of
marijuana had probable cause to arrest or to search.25 Courts may be ready
to rethink that bright-line rule.26
Other states’ courts have shown a willingness either to expand Fourth
Amendment protection or to rely on state constitutional provisions to
counter the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment case law.27 For example,
the New Mexico and Hawaii State Supreme Courts have read the United
States Supreme Court’s overflight case law narrowly to protect defendants
growing marijuana in those states.28 Similarly, the Colorado Supreme Court

22. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018) (“As Justice
Brandeis explained in his famous dissent, the Court is obligated—as ‘[s]ubtler and more farreaching means of invading privacy have become available to the Government’—to ensure
that the ‘progress of science’ does not erode Fourth Amendment protections.” (quoting
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473–74 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))); Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. 373, 401 (2014) (“Our holding, of course, is not that the information on
a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a warrant is generally required before
such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest.”); Jones, 565 U.S. at 411
(“What we apply is an 18th-century guarantee against unreasonable searches, which we
believe must provide at a minimum the degree of protection it afforded when it was
adopted.”). See generally John R. Kroger, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Trump and
Roberts, 55 GONZ. L. REV. 1 (2019); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Smart Fourth
Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 547 (2017).
23. When approaching twenty-first-century technologies, the Court recognized that
circumstances now necessitate a new way to “apply the Fourth Amendment to a new
phenomenon.” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216.
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See infra Part IV.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. See State v. Davis, 360 P.3d 1161, 1164, 1173 (N.M. 2015) (holding that
warrantless aerial surveillance of a greenhouse via helicopter, involving prolonged hovering
at a height of fifty feet while kicking up dust and debris, was an unconstitutional search); see
also State v. Quiday, 405 P.3d 552, 558–59 (Haw. 2017) (holding that an individual has a
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recently rejected the Supreme Court’s dog-sniff jurisprudence in favor of
stronger Fourth Amendment protections.29
Are these cases an aberration or a trend? This Article argues that we are
at the threshold of an expanded Fourth Amendment.30 Judge Edwards
suggested that reclaiming constitutional principles is not easy;31 I do not
pretend that it is. However, changing perceptions about the War on Drugs
may have a spillover effect that eases reclamation of the Fourth
Amendment.32
Part II reviews some of the areas where the War on Drugs helped shrink
the Fourth Amendment.33 Part III briefly discusses some of the cases,
including the recent technology cases, which may point towards the Court’s
willingness to rethink its Fourth Amendment case law.34 Part IV turns to
developments in state courts, with a particular focus on states that have
legalized medical and/or recreational marijuana.35 At least tentatively, this
Article argues that recent cases demonstrate exhaustion with the War on
Drugs and a trend towards a new, more invigorated Fourth Amendment.36
II. The Vanishing Fourth Amendment
A. The Warren Court
Students of constitutional criminal procedure are familiar with the
Warren Court’s criminal procedural revolution, effectively beginning with
Mapp v. Ohio in 1961, and ending with the end of Chief Justice Warren’s

reasonable expectation of privacy from governmental aerial surveillance of his or her
curtilage and residence).
29. People v. McKnight, 446 P.3d 397, 414 (Colo. 2019) (holding that a sniff from a
dog trained to detect marijuana is a search requiring suspicion of criminal activity and a
warrant).
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See Hartness v. Bush, 919 F.2d 170, 175 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., dissenting)
(“Constitutional principles, once abandoned, are not easily reclaimed.”).
32. See generally Don Stemen, Beyond the War: The Evolving Nature of the U.S.
Approach to Drugs, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 375 (2017) (examining the context of the
War on Drugs, shifts in policy and public perception, and how enforcement laws and
policies changed through the 1970s up to the 2010s).
33. See infra Part II.
34. See infra Part III.
35. See infra Part IV.
36. See infra Part IV.
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tenure on the bench in 1969.37 Mapp held that the exclusionary rule is the
constitutionally mandated remedy for Fourth Amendment violations.38 Over
the next eight years, the Court found that virtually all individual protections
in the Bill of Rights applied to the states as well as the federal
government.39 Similarly, the Warren Court largely expanded the scope of
the Fourth Amendment during that same period.40
Probable cause and warrant requirements were the centerpiece of the
Warren Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Though the Court
recognized some notable exceptions to the probable cause warrant
protection, it required any exception to be “strictly tied to and justified
by”41 the justifications that made such an exception reasonable. One scholar
labeled this approach as the “principle of particular justification.”42
This approach has an obvious advantage: it provides a coherent
explanation for exactly what makes a police officer’s conduct reasonable.
Thus, in Chimel v. California, the Court narrowed a search-incident-to-alawful-arrest to the area within the arrestee’s “immediate control.”43
Supreme Court precedent had previously allowed officers making an inhome arrest to search the arrestee’s home without securing a warrant and
without having probable cause to search for evidence.44 The Chimel Court
feared pretextual arrests in a suspect’s home would allow officers to
circumvent the probable cause and search warrant requirements.45
37. 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see Jerold H. Israel, Selective Incorporation: Revisited, 71
GEO. L.J. 253, 253 (1982) (observing that the Warren Court “expanded the reach of
constitutional regulation of criminal procedure many times beyond that which had been
attained through all of the Court’s constitutional rulings over the previous 170 years”).
38. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655 (“[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a state court.”).
39. Israel, supra note 37, at 253.
40. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 353 (1967) (holding, famously,
“the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places” and expanding the Fourth
Amendment’s protection beyond its traditional realm of only physically trespassory police
action to include any government violation of a subjective expectation of privacy that
society is prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable).
41. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (citations omitted).
42. James B. White, The Fourth Amendment as a Way of Talking About People: A Study
of Robinson and Matlock, 1974 SUP. CT. REV. 165, 190.
43. 395 U.S. 752, 763–64 (1969).
44. See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 151–52 (1947) (sustaining a warrantless
search through a four-room apartment as “incident to arrest”).
45. See 395 U.S. at 767 (“The petitioner correctly points out that one result of [cases not
limiting searches to the ‘grabbing area’] is to give law enforcement officials the opportunity
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Searching within the suspect’s “grabbing area” is reasonable because the
search-incident doctrine is premised on the need to protect the arresting
officer and to prevent destruction of evidence.46 Searching beyond that area,
therefore, exceeds the specific justifications underlying the exception to the
probable cause warrant requirement.47
The Warren Court also redefined the meaning of a Fourth Amendment
“search” to reflect the development of modern technology. In Katz v.
United States, FBI agents had attached a listening device to a telephone
booth that a gambler was using to transmit bets.48 Consistent with Supreme
Court precedent, the agents did not use a listening device that physically
penetrated the phone booth.49 As framed in the grant of certiorari, the Court
was to resolve whether a phone booth is a constitutionally protected area; if
so, the Court would then determine whether physical penetration of that
area is required to render a search and seizure violative of the Fourth
Amendment.50 The Court rejected that proposed formulation and, implicitly
rejecting property concepts as the prevailing Fourth Amendment model,
tied the definition of a “search” to an individual’s expectation of privacy.51
These cases are illustrative of the Warren Court’s bold—though some
would argue foolhardy—efforts to invigorate defendants’ procedural
protections. Often, racial bias motivated the Court.52 Notable cases involved
minority defendants tried in the South.53

to engage in searches not justified by probable cause, by the simple expedient of arranging to
arrest suspects at home rather than elsewhere.”).
46. Id. at 762–63 (“[O]therwise, the officer’s safety might well be endangered, and the
arrest itself frustrated.”).
47. Id. at 763 (“There is no comparable justification, however, for routinely searching
any room other than that in which an arrest occurs—or, for that matter, for searching through
all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.”).
48. 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
49. Id.; see Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961); see also Goldman v.
United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134–35 (1942).
50. Katz v. United States, 386 U.S. 954, 954–55 (1967).
51. Katz, 389 U.S. at 350–51.
52. See generally FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970).
53. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491–92 (1966) (determining that
Ernesto Miranda’s constitutional rights were violated) (“[I]t is clear that Miranda was not in
any way apprised of his right to consult with an attorney and to have one present during the
interrogation, nor was his right not to be compelled to incriminate himself effectively
protected in any other manner. Without these warnings the statements were inadmissible.”).
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B. The Nixon-Burger Court
Also familiar history for students of constitutional criminal procedure,
the Warren Court’s expansive interpretations of the Bill of Rights resulted
in a backlash.54 The Court’s decision in Miranda v. Arizona produced calls
to impeach Earl Warren.55 Presidential candidates George Wallace and
Richard Nixon made law-and-order a central campaign issue.56 They did so
at a time when crime rates were on the rise.57 During their campaigns,
Nixon and Wallace unfairly created links in the public’s consciousness
between riots in American cities, the rise in crime rates, and Warren Court
precedent.58
Once he was in office, President Nixon made four appointments to the
Court within a two-year period.59 Nixon’s selections delivered on his lawand-order campaign promise.60 For example, soon-to-be-appointed Chief
Justice Warren Burger came to Nixon’s attention because of his prominent
law-and-order stance.61 Critics have debated whether the Nixon-Burger

54. See generally GRAHAM, supra note 52.
55. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER COURT AND THE RISE
OF THE JUDICIAL RIGHT 2–3 (2016) (including a photograph of an “IMPEACH EARL
WARREN” billboard along a California highway).
56. William G. Ross, The Supreme Court as an Issue in Presidential Campaigns, 37 J.
SUP. CT. HIST. 322, 331–32 (2012); see also KEVIN J. MCMAHON, NIXON’S COURT: HIS
CHALLENGE TO JUDICIAL LIBERALISM AND ITS POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 37–62 (2011).
57. See GRAHAM, supra note 52, at 299 (detailing increases in frequency of criminal
activity during this period); see also GRAETZ & GREENHOUSE, supra note 55, at 12.
58. See LIVA BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 224 (1st ed. 1983) (stating
that, during Nixon’s speech accepting the Republican presidential nomination, he
“promise[d] . . . voters that night that ‘the wave of crime is not going to be the wave of the
future in the United States of America,’ [and] that the restoration of law and order would be
a linchpin of his administration”); see also MCMAHON, supra note 56, at 41–43 (explaining
that in Wallace’s standard stump speech, he “linked the rise in crime to the Court by telling
those assembled, ‘If you walk out of this hotel tonight and someone knocks you on the head,
he’ll be out of jail before you’re out of the hospital, and on Monday morning they’ll try the
policeman instead of the criminal.’”).
59. Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
members_text.aspx (last visited Sept. 12, 2020).
60. EARL M. MALTZ, THE COMING OF THE NIXON COURT: THE 1972 TERM AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (2016).
61. MCMAHON, supra note 56, at 114.
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Court effectuated a counter-revolution.62 Many of the Court’s decisions
either cabined Warren Court precedent or refused to extend its case law.
Cases like United States v. Robinson shifted the new majority’s approach
to Fourth Amendment questions in two respects.63 Crucially, Robinson
moved away from the Warren Court’s “principle of particular
justification.”64 It also signaled the Burger Court’s preference for brightline rules.
In Robinson, the officer arrested the defendant for driving on a
suspended license and acknowledged that he did not fear for his safety. 65
The D.C. Circuit Court found the search of the defendant’s crumpled
cigarette packet containing heroin was illegal because it exceeded the
underlying justification for a search-incident-to-a-lawful arrest.66 The
Burger Court rejected such a narrowly tailored reading of the law.67 Instead,
it found reasonable a general rule governing custodial arrests.68 The opinion
reflected a change in the framework of analysis, away from the Warren
Court’s major premise of probable cause and warrants with narrow
exceptions.69 The Burger Court saw the reasonableness prong of the Fourth
Amendment as its major premise, not probable cause and warrants.70
62. See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, Preface to THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION THAT WASN’T xi, xii (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983) (“The story of the Burger Court
to date, whatever else it might be, is not a tale of a conservative counter-revolution, at least
not one of epic proportions or obvious import.”).
63. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
64. See id. at 236 (“Since it is the fact of custodial arrest which gives rise to the
authority to search, it is of no moment that [the officer] did not indicate any subjective fear
of the respondent or that he did not himself suspect that respondent was armed.”).
65. Id. at 221–22, 236.
66. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1103–04 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
67. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (“[O]ur more fundamental disagreement with the
Court of Appeals arises from its suggestion that there must be litigated in each case the issue
of whether or not there was present one of the reasons supporting the authority for a search
of the person incident to the lawful arrest.”).
68. See id. (“A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the
arrest requires no additional justification.”).
69. See id. at 226 (“Since [prior search-incident-to-a-lawful-arrest decisions] speak not
simply in terms of an exception to the warrant requirement, but in terms of an affirmative
authority to search, they clearly imply that such searches also meet the Fourth Amendment’s
requirement of reasonableness.”).
70. See id. at 235; see also Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court’s Turn Toward a General
Reasonableness Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119, 121–22
(1989).
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Additionally, Robinson emphasized the need for bright lines, an approach
that was soon to dominate the Court’s Fourth Amendment analysis.71
While the Burger Court demonstrated a general commitment to
expanding police power and cutting back on Warren Court precedent, the
liberal wing of the Court still achieved some successes. For example, the
Court in Coolidge v. New Hampshire found unconstitutional a New
Hampshire law that allowed the state’s attorney general, rather than a
“neutral and detached magistrate,” to issue search warrants.72 In that case,
the state attempted to argue exceptions to the warrant requirement.73 The
Court rejected each argument, which would have cut back on Warren Court
case law.74
The Court’s liberal wing similarly prevailed in United States v.
Chadwick. There, the Supreme Court took up the government’s contention
that, after Katz, only high privacy zones, like “homes, offices, and private
communications, implicate interests which lie at the core of the Fourth
Amendment” and therefore require warrants.75 Chadwick involved the
warrantless search of a footlocker that federal agents had probable cause to
believe contained a large quantity of marijuana.76 In the trial court, the
government attempted to justify the warrantless search based on the
“automobile exception” to the warrant requirement.77 Rather than pressing
that same point in the Supreme Court, the government instead argued that
police must secure warrants only when they seek to search in a home or
office.78 In a 7–2 decision, Chief Justice Burger rejected that position out of

71. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235 (“The authority to search the person incident to a
lawful custodial arrest, while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does
not depend on what a court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest
situation that weapons or evidence would in fact be found upon the person of the suspect. A
custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the
Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no
additional justification.”).
72. 403 U.S. 443, 447, 449 (1971).
73. Id. at 445, 453–73.
74. See id. at 456, 458, 464 (rejecting the state’s arguments that (1) the search and
seizure were “‘incident’ to a valid arrest,” (2) “the police may make a warrantless search of
an automobile whenever they have probable cause to do so,” and (3) “the car itself was an
‘instrumentality of the crime’”).
75. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7 (1977).
76. Id. at 3–4.
77. Id. at 5.
78. Id. at 7.
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hand and, among other things, offered full-throated support for the warrant
requirement.79
C. Ronald Reagan and the Real War on Drugs
Many more major changes were on the horizon. Despite claiming to
launch a War on Drugs, Nixon was less invested in that war than was
Ronald Reagan.80 Nixon was instrumental in the passage of the Controlled
Substances Act, which resulted in the classification of marijuana, LSD, and
other drugs as Schedule I.81 Despite that legislation, punishments for drug
offenses were not especially severe during President Nixon’s tenure. 82
President Reagan was a far more committed anti-drug warrior.83 His
administration led efforts to increase penalties for drug offenses, including
marijuana offenses, and to expand police efforts to target drug offenders.84
Drug defendants challenged many of those aggressive police practices.85

79. See id. at 7, 11 (“There being no exigency, it was unreasonable for the Government
to conduct this search without the safeguards a judicial warrant provides.”).
80. See Andrew B. Whitford & Jeff Yates, Policy Signals and Executive Governance:
Presidential Rhetoric in the War on Drugs, 65 J. POL. 995, 998 (2003) (“Nixon was the first
president to use the phrase ‘war on drugs[,]’ . . . but the recent War on Drugs began as a part
of Ronald Reagan’s crime control strategy.”); see also JOHN HUDAK, MARIJUANA 59–84
(2016) (“Ronald Reagan steered America back on course to a full-fledged War on Drugs.”).
81. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended in 21 U.S.C. §§ 801, 951 (2018)).
82. See Stemen, supra note 32, at 397–400 (observing a decrease in average length of
state-imposed sentences and an increase in federally-imposed sentences).
83. Addressing the nation in 1986, President Reagan affirmed his commitment to
combating drug use: “From the beginning of our administration, we’ve taken strong steps to
do something about this horror. . . . Thirty-seven Federal agencies are working together in a
vigorous national effort, and by next year our spending levels for drug law enforcement will
have more than tripled from its 1981 levels.” Address to the Nation on the Campaign
Against Drug Abuse, September 14, 1986, RONALD REAGAN PRESIDENTIAL LIBR. & MUSEUM,
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/091486a (last visited Sept. 29, 2020).
84. Editors, War on Drugs, HIST. (Dec. 17, 2019), https://www.history.com/topics/
crime/the-war-on-drugs. See generally JOHANN HARI, CHASING THE SCREAM: THE FIRST AND
LAST DAYS OF THE WAR ON DRUGS (2015); THOMAS C. ROWE, FEDERAL NARCOTICS LAWS
AND THE WAR ON DRUGS: MONEY DOWN A RAT HOLE (Routledge 2012) (2006); DAN BAUM,
SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE WAR ON DRUGS AND THE POLITICS OF FAILURE (1996).
85. Cf. Sandra Bass, Policing Space, Policing Race: Social Control Imperatives and
Police Discretionary Decisions, 28 SOC. JUST. 156, 164–72 (2001) (observing the disparate
impact of the War on Drugs on African Americans and the efforts taken to challenge drug
policies).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss2/4

2021]

THE RENEWED FOURTH AMENDMENT?

297

Unlike its decisions during the 1970s, the Supreme Court now largely
upheld aggressive police practices.86 In doing so, it shrank the Fourth
Amendment. Many, if not most, of the Fourth Amendment cases during the
period from the 1980s into the 2000s involved defendants arrested for drug
activity.87 The cases discussed below represent significant Fourth
Amendment decisions, but this Article does not pretend to canvass all the
areas where the Court eroded the Fourth Amendment.88
1. Drug-Sniffing Dogs
Police have relied on dogs for centuries because of their acute sense of
smell.89 Using dogs for detection of drugs took hold in the 1970s and
continues today.90 The process involves police exposing luggage or other
items to trained dogs who then signal the presence of drugs.91 But do the
police need any prior justification for this action? Framed in Fourth
Amendment terms, is a dog-sniff a search? Obviously, a dog-sniff usually

86. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989) (establishing an “objective
reasonableness” standard for claims that law enforcement officials have used excessive
force); see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (affirming, unanimously,
the application of Terry doctrine when an officer seeks to investigate a felony that has
already been completed); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173, 184 (1984) (upholding
an officer’s search, nearly a mile past “no trespassing” signs into defendant’s property, that
revealed marijuana as valid under the open fields doctrine); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 922 (1984) (establishing the “good faith” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
exclusionary rule).
87. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 376–77 (1993) (extending the
“plain view” doctrine to uphold seizure of small lump of crack cocaine from defendant’s
pocket); see also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439–40 (1991) (upholding random bus
searches for drugs performed by multiple uniformed officers where a “reasonable person”
would feel free to decline a search); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 548–49,
559–60 (1980) (holding that a woman “freely and voluntarily” followed DEA agents into a
small examination room and consented to a strip search that revealed two small packages of
heroin in her underwear).
88. For an introduction to the beginning of the Court’s disassembly of the Fourth
Amendment after the Warren Court years, see Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible
Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257 (1984).
89. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 23 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 15 (Kagan, J., concurring) (observing that the use of “drug-detection dogs
actually go[es] back . . . only a few decades”).
91. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 699 (1983) (describing agents
subjecting airline luggage to a “‘sniff test’ by a trained narcotics detection dog”).
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does not require a physical trespass.92 However, the Warren Court shifted
the focus of the Fourth Amendment’s inquiry from property concepts to
privacy expectations in Katz,93 and a dog-sniff certainly reveals information
that a person seeks to keep private.
The Court answered the question in United States v. Place.94 There, the
police had detained the defendant’s luggage for an extensive period so
officers could expose his luggage to a drug-sniffing dog.95 The Court found
that the detention was an unlawful seizure.96 In dicta, however, the Court
resolved the lingering Katz question about dogs: a dog-sniff is “sui
generis,” revealing only the presence or absence of contraband.97 According
to Justice O’Connor, an individual has a limited expectation of privacy in
the possession of contraband.98
The Court reaffirmed and extended Place in Illinois v. Caballes.99 There,
officers stopped individuals for traffic offenses and exposed the vehicles to
drug-sniffing dogs.100 The Court held that if the police did not detain any
individual beyond the time needed to cite the driver, such practices did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.101
As developed below, cases like Place and Caballes seemed premised on
the Justices’ belief in the near-infallibility of drug-sniffing dogs.102 After
those two cases, the police had a powerful tool in their efforts against drug
trafficking. But dogs’ noses would hardly be the only tools that the Court
would endorse.

92. The maneuver performed by trained detection dogs is sometimes referred to as a
“free air sniff.” Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 240 (2013).
93. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 347, 351 (1967) (“For the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.”).
94. 462 U.S. 696.
95. See id. at 699.
96. Id. at 710.
97. See id. at 707 (explaining investigative procedures employed in a dog sniff are
unique in that “no other investigative procedure . . . is so limited both in the manner in which
the information is obtained and in the content of the information revealed by the
procedure”).
98. Id.
99. 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
100. See id. at 406.
101. Id. at 407–08.
102. See infra Section IV.B.
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2. Overflight Cases
When the Court’s Fourth Amendment case law relied almost exclusively
on property concepts, the Supreme Court held that officers who entered an
owner’s open fields did not violate the Fourth Amendment.103 After Katz,
lower courts struggled to determine whether defendants might have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in areas not immediately adjacent to their
homes.104
The facts in many post-Katz cases suggest that an “open field” is hardly a
simple concept. Imagine rural land, far from major roadways or population
centers, fenced, and marked with NO TRESPASSING signs. Might one
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in such a place? One would have
thought that the answer to be, “It depends.” Not so, according to the
Supreme Court in Oliver v. United States.105 Justice Powell, writing for the
Court, seemed to believe that a bright line existed between open fields (no
reasonable expectation of privacy) and the curtilage of a house (reasonable
expectation of privacy).106 Thus, under this view, officers would only be
conducting a Fourth Amendment search if they sought to collect
information about activities within the curtilage. Whatever one might think
about the Court’s finding that individuals cannot claim privacy in land
outside the curtilage, Justice Powell was surprised to learn that owners and
occupiers of land have no justifiable expectations of privacy even within
the curtilage.107
103. Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 58–59 (1924).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1133–34 (1st Cir. 1978) (holding
appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in private land that “was not
posted; [had] no fence or chain to impede visitors; [and was approached] by the officers . . .
openly in broad daylight”); see also Patler v. Slayton, 503 F.2d 472, 478 (4th Cir. 1974)
(“Appellants’ reasonable expectations of privacy—while extending to their dwellings and
the immediate area around them and even to the area occupied by outbuildings such as the
barns in question . . .—cannot, in light of Hester, be said to include the ‘open fields’ around
the barn.” (quoting United States v. Brown, 487 F.2d 208, 210 (4th Cir. 1983) (alterations in
original))).
105. 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (“[T]he asserted expectation of privacy in open fields is
not an expectation that ‘society recognizes as reasonable.’”).
106. See id. at 178–79.
107. Compare id. at 178 (“[A]n individual may not legitimately demand privacy for
activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the
home.”), with California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 219 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court’s “conclusory rejection of respondent’s expectation of privacy in the
yard of his residence . . . represents a turning away from the principles that have guided our
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In California v. Ciraolo, Santa Clara Police sought to corroborate a tip
that the defendant was growing marijuana in his backyard, an area fenced in
too well to allow officers to peer in.108 Instead, officers used a private plane
to fly over the defendant’s backyard, where they observed marijuana.109 A
5–4 majority held that aerial surveillance in this case did not amount to a
search.110 Justice Powell dissented, raising concerns that technological
advances threatened the erosion of privacy of the home.111
The police conduct in Florida v. Riley was even more intrusive.112 There,
the defendant took substantial steps to exclude the public from his
property.113 As summarized by Justice White’s plurality opinion:
Respondent Riley lived in a mobile home located on five acres
of rural property. A greenhouse was located 10 to 20 feet behind
the mobile home. Two sides of the greenhouse were enclosed.
The other two sides were not enclosed but the contents of the
greenhouse were obscured from view from surrounding property
by trees, shrubs, and the mobile home. The greenhouse was
covered by corrugated roofing panels, some translucent and
some opaque. At the time relevant to this case, two of the panels,
amounting to approximately 10% of the roof area, were missing.
A wire fence surrounded the mobile home and the greenhouse,
and the property was posted with a “DO NOT ENTER” sign.114
To corroborate a tip, officers used a helicopter.115 Flying 400 feet above the
property, “[w]ith his naked eye, [an officer] was able to see through the
openings in the roof and one or more of the open sides of the greenhouse
and to identify what he thought was marijuana growing in the structure.”116
Fourth Amendment inquiry” and is “curiously at odds with its purported reaffirmation of the
curtilage doctrine”).
108. 476 U.S. at 209.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 213–14 (“Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced
down could have seen everything that these officers observed. On this record, we readily
conclude that respondent’s expectation that his garden was protected from such observation
is unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is prepared to honor.”).
111. Id. at 222–25 (Powell, J., dissenting).
112. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).
113. See id. at 448.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
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Although the majority divided on the relevant test to explain why, five
justices found that the police conduct did not amount to a Fourth
Amendment search.117 By 1989—the year of the Riley decision—Justice
Kennedy had replaced Justice Powell.118 Given his dissent in Ciraolo,
Justice Powell must have been even more shocked at the result in Riley.119
One might ask, then, what a rural resident must do to maintain privacy.
Read in context, Riley and Ciraolo gave police a powerful tool in the War
on Drugs. In rural areas of California known for marijuana production, and
elsewhere, individuals were under siege conditions.120
3. Pretext Stops, Trivial Offenses, and Search-Incident-to-Lawful Arrest
Many years ago, I presented the following hypothetical to my Criminal
Procedure classes:
An officer was sitting in his patrol car. He was in a bad mood when he
noticed a family heading off on vacation in a station wagon filled with
luggage. Mom was driving, Dad was in the front seat, and two teenagers
were in the backseat with their backpacks nearby. The officer realized that
the driver was a woman whom he had tried to date, but who had not been
interested in him. Out of sheer spite, or maybe even racial animus, the
officer followed the vehicle until the driver sped slightly over the speed
limit or made a lane change without signaling before doing so. I then asked
students whom and where the officer could search after he pulled the
vehicle over.121
117. Compare id. at 450 (“Because the sides and roof of his greenhouse were left
partially open, however, what was growing in the greenhouse was subject to viewing from
the air. Under the holding in Ciraolo, Riley could not reasonably have expected the contents
of his greenhouse to be immune from examination by an officer seated in a fixed-wing
aircraft flying in navigable airspace . . . .”), with id. at 453, 455 (O’Connor, J., concurring)
(reasoning that, since Ciraolo relied on the fact that “public air travel at 1,000 feet is a
sufficiently routine part of modern life,” “if the public can generally be expected to travel
[via helicopter] over residential backyards at an altitude of 400 feet” then “Riley cannot
reasonably expect his curtilage to be free from such aerial observation”).
118. See Justices 1789 to Present, supra note 59.
119. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (Powell, J., dissenting).
120. See Julie Johnson, Mendocino Marijuana Raids Reflect Stepped-Up Enforcement on
Illegal Operators, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, Cal.) (July 26, 2019), https://www.
pressdemocrat.com/news/9830280-181/mendocino-marijuana-raids-reflect-californias. See
generally PETER HECHT, WEED LAND: INSIDE AMERICA’S MARIJUANA EPICENTER AND HOW
POT WENT LEGIT (2014).
121. Unfortunately, some police are inclined to use such stops aggressively. See
generally MALCOLM GLADWELL, TALKING TO STRANGERS: WHAT WE SHOULD KNOW ABOUT
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I began using this hypothetical in the early 1980s. At that time, the Court
had concerns about pretextual police conduct.122 Lower courts occasionally
inquired into whether a stop or search was pretextual.123 Also, the Supreme
Court had suggested that some traffic violations may be too trivial to
support a full custodial arrest and subsequent search of the vehicle under
the Fourth Amendment.124 Well into the 2000s, though, and fueled in part

THE PEOPLE WE DON’T KNOW 6 (2019) (examining prejudiced and incompetent traffic stops
as a symptom of social dysfunction in the United States).
122. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) (approving an automobile
inventory search considering that there had been “no showing that the police . . . acted in bad
faith or for the sole purpose of the investigation”); see also Steagald v. United States, 451
U.S. 204, 215 (1981) (holding that using an arrest warrant to justify entry into a third party’s
home is invalid due to an impermissible likelihood of its pretextual use); Colorado v.
Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 4 (1980) (per curiam) (finding that an officer’s approach of an
automobile at a service station to issue a citation where he saw items that matched a
description of recently stolen items was “entirely legitimate”); United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 221 n.1 (1973) (leaving open the possibility that different facts may invite
inquiry into whether using a “subsequent traffic violation arrest as a mere pretext for a
narcotics search” would be unconstitutional); id. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“There is
always the possibility that a police officer, lacking probable cause to obtain a search warrant,
will use a traffic arrest as a pretext to conduct a search.”).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 215, 219–20 (7th Cir. 1996) (asking, but
not reaching, the question of whether a traffic stop was pretextual where an officer pulled
over defendant’s car because the air freshener hanging by a string from his rear-view mirror
was a material “obstruction” of his view); United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 786 (2d Cir.
1994) (Newman, C.J., concurring) (“[S]ome police officers will use the pretext of traffic
violations or other minor infractions to harass members of groups identified by factors that
are totally impermissible as a basis for law enforcement activity-factors such as race or
ethnic origin, or simply appearances that some police officers do not like . . . .”); United
States v. Strickland, 902 F.2d 937, 940 (11th Cir. 1990) (“[I]nvestigatory stops are invalid as
pretextual unless ‘a reasonable officer would have made the seizure in the absence of
illegitimate motivation.’” (quoting United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir.
1986))); United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988) (“A pretextual stop
occurs when the police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to search a person
or place, or to interrogate a person, for an unrelated serious crime for which they do not have
the reasonable suspicion necessary to support a stop.”), overruled by United States v.
Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995).
124. See Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 114 (1998) (holding that a full search of a
vehicle following issuance of a citation for speeding violated the Fourth Amendment); see
also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–63 (1979) (“Were the individual subject to
unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the security
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed. . . . [P]eople are
not shorn of all Fourth Amendment protection when they step from their homes onto the
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by the War on Drugs, the answers to my hypothetical kept changing as
police power kept expanding.
To wit: in Whren v. United States, plain-clothes vice-squad officers made
a traffic stop while patrolling in an area known for drug trafficking. 125
Viewed objectively, one would be hard pressed to explain why those
officers would be interested in writing a traffic ticket.126 Of course, they
were not. Instead, they observed two African American men and managed
to escalate a traffic stop into a successful drug arrest.127 A unanimous Court
rejected the defendants’ claim that the stop was pretextual.128 If the officers
had probable cause to make a traffic stop—even though these officers
seemed indifferent to enforcing traffic laws—the stop was lawful.129
The Court gave short shrift to concerns about racial profiling130 and
suggested that the motorists might raise an equal protection challenge.131 Of
course, winning such a challenge is more theoretical than real.132
So much for trying to limit discriminatory and arbitrary stops. But what
then? What motorist does not violate some traffic statute on a regular basis?
Who does not exceed the speed limit? If you doubt that, do an experiment
the next time you are driving. See how many motorists stay at the posted
speed. Indeed, if you find someone, see whether other motorists are

public sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those interests when they step from the sidewalks
into their automobiles.” (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972))).
125. 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996).
126. Would (or should) an officer see a “truck with temporary license plates and youthful
occupants” that remained at a stop sign “for what seemed an unusually long period of time”
and reasonably conclude that there must be a traffic violation in the works? Id.
127. See id. at 808, 810.
128. See id. at 813–16.
129. See id. at 818–19 (“The making of a traffic stop out of uniform does not remotely
qualify as such an extreme practice, and so is governed by the usual rule that probable cause
to believe the law has been broken ‘outbalances’ private interest in avoiding police
contact.”).
130. Id. at 813.
131. Id.
132. See generally David A. Harris, Racial Profiling Redux, 22 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
73 (2003) (discussing U.S. courts’ treatment of racial profiling cases post-Whren and post9/11); Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Profiling and the Constitution, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
163, 164 (examining “the constitutionality of using racial classifications in police
investigation[s]” under the “Fourth Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause”); Brandon
Garrett, Remedying Racial Profiling, 33 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 41 (2001) (describing,
evaluating, and presenting potential solutions to racial profiling problems in policing).
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tailgating that driver. While police can stop almost any motorist, can that
stop lead to a custodial arrest?
For many years, the Court left open the question whether some traffic
offenses are so minor that allowing a custodial arrest for such an offense
would violate the Fourth Amendment.133 Several justices suggested that the
Fourth Amendment imposed some limits on an officer’s ability to make a
custodial arrest.134 However, when the Court finally addressed the question
of when custodial arrests are appropriate during a routine traffic stop in
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, it rejected such a limitation.135 It did so in an
extreme example of overreaching by the police, demonstrating even further
erosion of the Fourth Amendment. As summarized by the majority in a 5–4
decision:
According to Atwater’s complaint (the allegations of which we
assume to be true for present purposes), [Officer] Turek
approached the truck and “yell[ed]” something to the effect of
“[w]e’ve met before” and “[y]ou’re going to jail.” He then called
for backup and asked to see Atwater’s driver’s license and
insurance documentation, which state law required her to
carry. . . . When Atwater told Turek that she did not have the
papers because her purse had been stolen the day before, Turek
said that he had “heard that story two-hundred times.”
Atwater asked to take her “frightened, upset, and crying”
children to a friend’s house nearby, but Turek told her, “[y]ou’re
not going anywhere.” As it turned out, Atwater’s friend learned
what was going on and soon arrived to take charge of the
children. Turek then handcuffed Atwater, placed her in his squad
car, and drove her to the local police station, where booking
officers had her remove her shoes, jewelry, and eyeglasses, and
empty her pockets. Officers took Atwater’s “mug shot” and
133. The Court consistently engaged in a case-by-case reasonableness-balancing test.
“To determine the constitutionality of a seizure ‘[w]e must balance the nature and quality of
the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the
governmental interests alleged to justify the intrusion.’” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8
(1985) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).
134. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662–63 (1979) (“Were the individual subject
to unfettered governmental intrusion every time he entered an automobile, the security
guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment would be seriously circumscribed.”).
135. 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001).
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placed her, alone, in a jail cell for about one hour, after which
she was taken before a magistrate and released on $310 bond.136
An angry officer who had prior experience with Atwater suggests some
personal animus.137 Escalating the confrontation in front of two young
children underscores the insensitivity of the officer’s conduct.138 While
Atwater is Caucasian,139 it is easy to imagine officers making similarly
unwarranted stops based on purely racial animus.140
Consider also a spin-off possibility: What if Officer Turek thought that
state law allowed him to make a custodial arrest when in fact it did not?
The Supreme Court has found on similar facts that the arresting officer did
not violate the Fourth Amendment.141
In Atwater’s case, Officer Turek did not find evidence of criminal
activity in her car.142 Atwater sued the city for a violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1983.143 Reconsider the hypothetical above. Once an officer, even one
making an arrest for a minor traffic offense, makes a custodial arrest
without violating the Fourth Amendment, consider the scope of the search
incident to that arrest.
The Court addressed that issue early in the War on Drugs. In New York v.
Belton, an officer stopped a vehicle for speeding.144 The officer developed
136. Id. at 324 (citations omitted).
137. Though the Court makes no mention of a personal history between the two, the
officer’s statements that “[w]e’ve met before” and “[y]ou’re going to jail” suggest otherwise.
Id.
138. Atwater was driving with her five-year-old and three-year-old with her in the front
seat. Id. at 323.
139. Matthew Yi, Justices OK Jail for Minor Infractions / Woman Was Arrested for SeatBelt Offense, SFGATE (Apr. 25, 2001), https://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Justices-OKjail-for-minor-infractions-Woman-2927870.php.
140. See State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 836 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) (detailing a situation
where two officers on gang patrol tail a car with two African-American men—one they had
never seen before, one recognized from an unsubstantiated rumor—looking for a legal
justification to make a stop, and the officers did not deny that the eventual stop was
pretextual).
141. See Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 166, 178 (2008) (holding that a custodial
arrest based on probable cause, although in violation of state law, is nonetheless lawful for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment).
142. See Atwater, 532 U.S. at 324 (charging Atwater with only “driving without her
seatbelt fastened, failing to secure her children in seatbelts, driving without a license, and
failing to provide proof of insurance”).
143. Id. at 325.
144. 453 U.S. 454, 455 (1981).
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probable cause to believe that the four occupants of the vehicle possessed
marijuana and that the vehicle may have been stolen.145 Faced with four
suspects, the officer ordered the four men to sit apart.146 The officer then
inspected the interior of the vehicle and found Belton’s leather jacket.147
Opening it on the scene, he found cocaine.148 The Court upheld the search
of Belton’s jacket as a valid search incident to a lawful arrest.149
The facts supported a finding that the officer acted reasonably: faced
with four suspects, the lone officer had legitimate concerns about his safety
and destruction of evidence.150 The majority, interested in articulating a
bright-line rule, went far beyond a potential narrow holding.151 Instead, the
Court held that when an officer makes a lawful arrest of an occupant or
recent occupant of a vehicle on the highway, the officer can reasonably
search the interior passenger compartment of that vehicle.152 The Fourth
Amendment would also allow a search of open or closed containers found
in the vehicle.153
Prior to Belton’s demise, my hypothetical officer, even if he felt no
concerns about safety and even if there was no evidence of the crime of
arrest (speeding or a lane change without signaling), the Court gave him
license to search anywhere in the vehicle. Uncertain was whether he could
open locked containers, but elsewhere the Court held that an officer could
search within the vehicle even when the search extended into passengers’
possessions.154

145. Id. at 455–56.
146. Id. at 456.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 462–63. Justice Stewart’s opinion carried the votes of Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist—the four Nixon appointees. See id. at 454,
463, 472. Justice Stevens concurred but did not join in the majority’s reasoning. Id. at 463.
Three justices dissented. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.); id. at 472
(White, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J.).
150. See id. at 456 (majority opinion).
151. The Court had the legitimate opportunity to adhere to the “principle of primary
justification” and limit its holding to situations where the concerns of officer safety and
evidence destruction predominate.
152. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
153. Id.
154. See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999) (“We hold that police officers
with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that
are capable of concealing the object of the search.”).
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One can say so much about why the Court was wrong in Belton.
Between the dissent, commentators, and lower courts, many have criticized
the decision.155 A few observations suffice here. The dissent offered many
examples to show that the bright line was not nearly as bright as
suggested.156 Professor Wayne LaFave took no pleasure in the majority’s
citation to his article, which supported bright lines in some circumstances,
arguing that Belton was not a good example of the need for bright lines.157
Many lower courts resisted application of Belton; in some instances, state
courts relied on their constitutional equivalent of the Fourth Amendment,
without more, to find such searches illegal.158

155. See id. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court today turns its back on the
product of [its search-incident-to-lawful-arrest] analysis, formulating an arbitrary ‘brightline’ rule applicable to ‘recent’ occupants of automobiles that fails to reflect Chimel’s
underlying policy justifications.”); see also Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a
Reason: An Empirical Reexamination of Chimel and Belton, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 657, 697
(examining the Court’s claims justifying its Belton rule and empirical data on police
practices and arrests) (“[T]he fact of custodial arrest should allow the police to search the
clothing the arrestee is wearing, but not the area around him, unless particular and unusual
facts justify such a search. The Court should reexamine Chimel and Belton.”). Many lower
courts have rejected Belton’s reasoning as well. See infra note 158.
156. Belton, 453 U.S. at 469 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s new approach leaves
open too many questions and, more important, it provides the police and the courts with too
few tools with which to find the answers.”).
157. After Belton, Professor LaFave explained his position on “bright lines” more fully.
See Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On Drawing “Bright
Lines” and “Good Faith”, 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 325–26 (1982).
158. See, e.g., State v. Gaskins, 866 N.W.2d 1, 12 (Iowa 2015) (“We now agree with the
approach taken by the courts that have rejected the Belton rule that authorized warrantless
searches of containers without regard to the Chimel considerations of officer safety and
protecting evidence.”); see also State v. Rowell, 188 P.3d 95, 100 (N.M. 2008) (“[W]e
decline the invitation of the State to follow the federal line of cases represented by
Belton . . . .”); Holman v. State, 183 P.3d 368, 377 (Wyo. 2008) (“[Following Belton] would
be creating a bright-line rule allowing the search of an entire vehicle any time a lone driver
is arrested, irrespective of probable cause or other surrounding circumstances.”); State v.
Bauder, 924 A.2d 38, 45, 47 (Vt. 2007) (“The concerns identified in the Belton dissent have
continued to gather support from courts and commentators alike. . . . [Vermont] rejected
Belton in favor of the traditional rule requiring that officers demonstrate a need to secure
their own safety or preserve evidence of a crime . . . .”); Camacho v. State, 75 P.3d 370, 376
(Nev. 2003) (“[W]e hold that the Nevada Constitution requires both probable cause and
exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search of an automobile incident to a lawful
custodial arrest.”); State v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 955, 959 (N.J. 1994) (“The Court’s holding
in Belton has been widely criticized. . . . We hold only that under article I, paragraph 7 of the
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Although Justice Stewart wrote the majority opinion in both Belton and
Chimel, most commentators reject his claim that the cases are consistent.159
As suggested above, Chimel is a classic Warren Court-era case focusing on
the principle of particular justification.160 Belton’s bright-line rule, on the
other hand, is over-inclusive: the rule allowed police to search based on the
legal arrest in a host of situations in which the underlying justifications did
not apply.161 But Belton’s bright line may not have been as bright as it
seemed, as it left much room for interpretation on slightly different facts:
What if, instead of four suspects and one officer, several police surrounded
a single driver and detained the driver? What if occupants of the vehicle
have left the vehicle and are now some distance from the car?162 Are they
still “recent occupant[s]?”163 What if the suspect is approaching her
vehicle—does the rule apply in such a case?164 What if police follow sound
procedures by putting the motorist in the police vehicle and only later seek
to return to the vehicle for a full search of its contents?165

New Jersey Constitution the rule of Belton shall not apply to warrantless arrests for motorvehicle offenses.”).
159. See, e.g., Moskovitz, supra note 155, at 673–74, 677 (“[S]trange scenario[s] would
have to be the norm for Belton to mesh with Chimel’s rationales for a search incident to
arrest.”).
160. See supra Section II.A.
161. The Court itself noted how the rule applied to situations outside any justifying
principle. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 461 (“It is true, of course, that these containers [which
police are now lawfully able to search] will sometimes be such that they could hold neither a
weapon nor evidence of the criminal conduct for which the suspect was arrested.”).
162. The Court held that it did not affect the police’s ability to search a suspect’s vehicle
when he had already parked and exited the car before his arrest. See Thornton v. United
States, 541 U.S. 615, 623–24 (2004) (applying the Belton rule “[s]o long as an arrestee is the
sort of ‘recent occupant’ of a vehicle such as [the defendant] was [in Thornton], officers may
search that vehicle incident to the arrest”).
163. Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
164. The dissenters in Belton raised similar concerns. Id. at 470 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“Does it matter whether the suspect is standing in close proximity to the car when the
search is conducted? Does it matter whether the police formed probable cause to arrest
before or after the suspect left his car?”).
165. Lower courts divided on this question following Belton. Compare United States v.
McCrady, 774 F.2d 868, 870, 875 (8th Cir. 1985) (upholding a search of an automobile
which took place immediately after an occupant had been arrested and placed in the police
car), with United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 787 (9th Cir. 1987) (suppressing evidence
from a search while the defendant was handcuffed in a police vehicle because “it is evident
that the search was not properly limited to the area within Vasey’s immediate control”).
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The previous examples demonstrate why the Court would eventually
overrule Belton. Despite Justice Stevens’s attempt to deny that his lead
opinion in Arizona v. Gant overruled Belton,166 almost no one takes his
claim seriously.167 For now, however, Belton is a dramatic example of the
Court’s War on Drugs case law, further eroding Fourth Amendment
protections. That erosion was seemingly in the name of advancing the War
on Drugs.168
By the late 2000s, the Court had had enough with such sweeping police
power: as indicated, the Court overruled Belton.169 Nonetheless, Belton
demonstrates yet another example of the Court’s willingness to erode
Fourth Amendment protection to advance the War on Drugs.
4. Unknowing and Irrational Waiver of Fourth Amendment Rights or
“Consent?”
Police have largely unchecked authority to make traffic stops. So,
assume that, lacking authority to arrest or probable cause to search the
vehicle, an officer asked the driver to consent to a search of her vehicle.
Assume also—as is so often the case—the driver did consent, leading to the
discovery of a significant amount of drugs. Did the driver make a voluntary
and knowing waiver of her Fourth Amendment right to be free from an
unreasonable search?

166. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (rejecting a broad reading of Belton).
167. Even other Justices on the Court saw that Gant overruled Belton. Id. at 355 (Alito,
J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision effectively overrules those important decisions [Belton and
Thornton], even though respondent Gant has not asked us to do so.”); see, e.g., Barbara E.
Armacost, Arizona v. Gant: Does it Matter?, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 275, 278–79 (“For all
practical purposes [Gant] means the end of Belton searches incident to arrest . . . .”).
168. Like in many cases in which the Court restricted or cabined Fourth Amendment
protections, the defendant in Belton faced drug possession charges. Belton, 453 U.S. at 462
(“It is not questioned that the respondent was the subject of a lawful custodial arrest on a
charge of possessing marihuana.”); Rudovsky, supra note 1, at 240 n.16 (listing seventeen
cases where the Court “sustained searches or seizures in the drug enforcement context in the
ten-year period of 1980–1990”).
169. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343 (“To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to
every recent occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications underlying
the Chimel exception. . . . Accordingly, we reject this reading of Belton and hold that the
Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest
only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search.”); see also Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229,
234–35 (2011) (recognizing that Gant “adopted a new, two-part rule,” abrogating Belton).
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If that hypothetical seems extreme, look at Florida v. Jimeno.170
Although the issue in Jimeno related to the scope of the defendant’s
consent,171 the facts provide a dramatic example of the irrationality of many
offenders’ consent to search. There, an officer stopped the defendant for a
traffic violation and told the defendant that he had reason to believe that the
defendant possessed drugs.172 The officer lacked probable cause to arrest or
to search.173 The defendant consented to the search, leading to the discovery
of a kilogram of cocaine.174 Consider whether the defendant made an
informed choice whether to consent to the search of his vehicle. If, as it
seems was the case, the officer lacked a justification to arrest or to search
the vehicle, the defendant faced the following options: to refuse to consent
and—absent a means for the officer to develop probable cause—leave the
scene, or to allow the search and face many years in prison.175
The Supreme Court’s consent case law began to evolve in the 1970s,
after the shift in the Court’s makeup.176 In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the
Court resolved a question that had divided lower courts: what did the state
have to show when it claimed that a defendant consented to a search?177
Arguably, a person consenting to a search is waiving one’s Fourth
Amendment rights. If so, the state would need to show that the decision was
informed. Some courts held that the state had to demonstrate that the
suspect knew of the right to refuse to consent.178 Defendants relied on the
FBI’s practice of warning suspects of their right to withhold consent as
support that the practice was practical.179 Further, courts that supported
such a showing could point to Miranda v. Arizona for support.180 The
Miranda Court was concerned with a case-by-case, voluntariness approach
170. 500 U.S. 248 (1991).
171. Id. at 249.
172. Id.
173. The officer had only “overheard . . . what appeared to be a drug transaction over a
public telephone.” Id.
174. Id. at 250 (emphasis added).
175. Federal sentencing statutes for the kilogram of cocaine require between five and
forty years of imprisonment, a fine of $5,000,000, or both. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2018).
176. See supra Section II.B.
177. 412 U.S. 218, 223 (1973).
178. See, e.g., Schoepflin v. United States, 391 F.2d 390, 399 (9th Cir. 1968) (remanding
on the issue of whether the defendant “knew he could freely and effectively withhold his
consent”).
179. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 287 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 281.
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and insisted on warnings to assure that the suspect knew that silence was an
option.181 Bustamonte rejected such a requirement.182
Though not entirely clear until subsequent cases, the Court rejected the
idea that a consent to search is a waiver of one’s Fourth Amendment
rights.183 Instead, the Court’s analysis treats consent as a matter of
reasonableness.184 Rather than focusing on the defendant’s state of mind,
the Court asks whether police were reasonable in their conduct,185 including
cases where they lack consent, but reasonably believe that they have
consent.186 While the Court decided Bustamonte in the 1970s, the Court has
repeatedly expanded its reasonableness analysis into the 1990s and
beyond.187 This reasonableness inquiry proved to be a powerful tool in the
War on Drugs.
Case law is replete with instances like Jimeno where suspects seemingly
make irrational choices. Instead of refusing consent, they acquiesce; instead
of driving away in freedom, they condemn themselves to prison terms.188
181. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 465 (1966) (“The abdication of the
constitutional privilege—the choice on his part to speak to the police—was not made
knowingly or competently because of the failure to apprise him of his rights . . . .”).
182. 412 U.S. at 248–49.
183. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990) (“But as we have
discussed, what is at issue when a claim of apparent consent is raised is not whether the right
to be free of searches has been waived, but whether the right to be free of unreasonable
searches has been violated.”).
184. See id. at 188–89 (holding that warrantless entry is valid when based upon consent
of third party whom police, at time of entry, reasonably believe to possess common authority
over premises); see also Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006) (holding that a
warrantless search was unreasonable as to defendant who was physically present and
expressly refused to consent); Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 298 (2014) (reasoning
that a “warrant is generally required for a search of a home,” but “the ultimate touchstone of
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness”) (citations omitted).
185. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 185 (“It is apparent that in order to satisfy the
‘reasonableness’ requirement of the Fourth Amendment, what is generally demanded of the
many factual determinations that must regularly be made by agents of the government . . . is
not that they always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.”).
186. See id. at 188–89 (clarifying that the Court did not decide the issue of
reasonableness on the facts of the case but held that if the search was reasonable, then it
would have been constitutionally permissible).
187. See, e.g., id.; Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (explaining that the
correct question is “whether the warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence
constitutional”).
188. See, e.g., RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS:
PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 19 (1985) (reporting that one of the most
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There are numerous cases where officers have stopped motorists on the
highway and managed to find drugs, despite lacking any level of
suspicion.189 Consent has proven to be a powerful tool for law enforcement.
In shifting the focus away from the idea that the consenting individual is
waiving a constitutional right, the Court has never adequately explained
why reasonableness, not waiver, is the critical question in such cases. The
Bustamonte Court seemed more interested in upholding a useful police tool
than in offering a coherent principle justifying consent searches.190 No
doubt, the Court’s consent case law has expanded police power to search
for drugs without probable cause.191 While advancing the War on Drugs,
the Court’s consent case law continued to erode Fourth Amendment
protections.

common warrant “exceptions” is consent and suggesting that ninety-eight percent of
warrantless searches fall under the “consent” umbrella, even though there is no precise data
on point).
189. See, e.g., People v. Zuniga, 372 P.3d 1052, 1054 (Colo. 2016) (holding that odor of
marijuana could contribute to probable cause determination); see also Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405, 406, 410 (2005) (holding that an otherwise lawful traffic stop where another
officer arrived at the scene while the stop was in progress and used a narcotics-detection dog
to sniff around the exterior of the motorist’s vehicle did not infringe the motorist’s Fourth
Amendment rights).
190. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973) (“[The] need for police
questioning [is] a tool for the effective enforcement of criminal laws. Without such
investigation, those who were innocent might be falsely accused, those who were guilty
might wholly escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved. In short, the security
of all would be diminished.”) (citations omitted)). Remember that officers have almost
unchecked power to stop any motorist for some traffic violation. Defendants are largely
unable to challenge an officer’s racial motivation in making the vehicle stop. Further, many
commentators believe that minority members are less likely than non-minorities to refuse
consent out of fear of unbridled police power.
191. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431–32, 439–40 (1991) (holding that
random bus searches conducted pursuant to passenger’s consent are not per se
unconstitutional even where there is no probable cause to search); see also Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 309–10, 314 (1959) (holding that where a government agent was given
information by an informer who had proved reliable in the past and agent observed
defendant who fit the description, there were reasonable grounds for believing that defendant
was committing a violation of the federal laws relating to narcotic drugs). For a percentage
of searches resulting from “consent,” see VAN DUIZEND ET AL., supra note 188.
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III. Reclaiming Constitutional Principles?
By the 2010s, a consensus began to emerge that the War on Drugs was a
failure. As developed in this section, the Supreme Court seems to have
noticed that fact and begun to revitalize the Fourth Amendment.
As discussed above, New York v. Belton offered police extensive
authority to search a person’s vehicle as long as the officer made a lawful
arrest.192 In theory, the Court’s ruling created a bright-line rule for police
making such arrests.193 At the same time, especially when viewed in
conjunction with other cases, Belton created authority that grossly exceeded
the underlying rationales for such searches.194
The Court’s decision in Thornton v. United States195 signaled trouble for
Belton. There, the police had not stopped Thornton’s vehicle, but saw that
his license plate was not registered for his vehicle.196 Police approached
him after he had already exited his vehicle.197 The police arrested him and
placed him in the back of a patrol car.198 Any claim that the defendant could
destroy evidence or grab a weapon would have been frivolous.199 Despite
that, the Court authorized the search of Thornton’s vehicle.200 Three justices

192. 453 U.S. 454 (1981); see also infra Section II.C.3.
193. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 462–63 (creating the bright-line rule that incident to a lawful
arrest, the police may search the area within the arrestee’s immediate control, including the
passenger compartment and anything found therein).
194. See infra Section II.C.3 (discussing Belton and the underlying rationales for
exceptions to the probable cause plus warrant requirements).
195. 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
196. Id. at 618.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Thornton was not in his vehicle nor near it at the time the officer approached him.
This, seemingly, would signal that Belton should not govern given that the rationale under
Belton includes concerns for officer safety when a vehicle passenger is in reaching distance
of closed compartments. Id. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“When petitioner’s car was
searched in this case, he was neither in, nor anywhere near, the passenger compartment of
his vehicle. Rather, he was handcuffed and secured in the back of the officer’s squad car.
The risk that he would nevertheless ‘grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]’ from his car was
remote in the extreme. The Court’s effort to apply our current doctrine to this search
stretches it beyond its breaking point, and for that reason I cannot join the Court’s
opinion.”).
200. See id. at 621, 623–24 (majority opinion) (holding that Belton governs even when an
officer does not make contact until the person arrested has left the vehicle and that, under
Belton, the Fourth Amendment allows an officer to search a vehicle’s passenger
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dissented, signaling grave doubts about the soundness of the holding.201
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment but
expressed doubts about Belton as well.202
Ultimately, the Court overruled Belton in Arizona v. Gant—despite
Justice Stevens’ claim to the contrary in his majority opinion.203 Gant
reverted to an earlier method of analysis: framing the warrant clause as the
major premise of the Fourth Amendment, and requiring any exceptions to
probable cause and warrants to be tied to an underlying rationale supporting
the exception.204 Hence, police can search a vehicle incident to a lawful
arrest only if the arrestee can still gain access to the interior of the vehicle
(officer safety rationale) or if officers have a reason to believe that evidence
of the offense of arrest remains in the vehicle (destruction of evidence
rationale).205
Technology has always presented the Court with tough-to-decide cases.
For example, when the Court first began to consider whether the Fourth
Amendment applied in cases where the police engaged in wiretapping, the
compartment as a contemporaneous incident of arrest, even when officer does not make
contact until the person arrested has already left the vehicle).
201. See id. at 624–25 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part); see id. at 636 (Stevens, J.,
joined by Souter, J., dissenting).
202. See id. at 625 (Scalia, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“I see three reasons
why the search in this case might have been justified to protect officer safety or prevent
concealment or destruction of evidence. None ultimately persuades me.”).
203. See 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009) (“Under this broad reading of Belton, a vehicle search
would be authorized incident to every arrest of a recent occupant notwithstanding that in
most cases the vehicle’s passenger compartment will not be within the arrestee’s reach at the
time of the search. To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every recent
occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel
exception—a result clearly incompatible with our statement in Belton that it ‘in no way
alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of
searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.’ Accordingly, we reject this reading of Belton
and hold that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent
occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the
passenger compartment at the time of the search.”) (citation omitted).
204. See id. at 337–38 (“Relying on our earlier decision in Chimel, . . . the searchincident-to-arrest exception to the warrant requirement is justified by interests in officer
safety and evidence preservation. When ‘the justifications underlying Chimel no longer exist
because the scene is secure and the arrestee is handcuffed, secured in the back of a patrol
car, and under the supervision of an officer,’ the court concluded, a ‘warrantless search of
the arrestee’s car cannot be justified as necessary to protect the officers at the scene or
prevent the destruction of evidence.’”) (citations omitted).
205. See id.
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Court initially found that it did not because words are not capable of being
seized.206 Further, because of the facts of the case at issue, the police did not
trespass on the defendant’s property.207 Over time, the Court reversed itself
on both grounds.208 First, it held that when police use listening devices they
are seizing words.209 Later, in Katz, the Court rejected the need for a
technical trespass.210
Throughout the War on Drugs, state and federal governments usually
won in cases involving technology.211 For example, the Court held in
United States v. Knotts that the police did not conduct a search when they
attached a beeper to a container that they knew would be in the defendant’s
possession.212 Even though the beeper allowed the police to locate the
defendant without fear of detection, the Court found that such a device

206. See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466–66 (1928) (holding that
wiretapping of defendant did not constitute an unreasonable search or seizure because the
insertions of the wires were made without trespass upon any property and finding no
justification for extending the persons, places, and things language of the Fourth
Amendment to spoken words).
207. Id. at 466.
208. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“Indeed, we have expressly
held that the Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible items, but extends
as well to the recording of oral statements overheard without any ‘technical trespass under
local property law.’” (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961))).
209. See id. (emphasis added).
210. See id. (holding that the government’s activities in electronically listening to and
recording defendant’s words spoken into telephone receiver in public telephone booth
violated the privacy upon which defendant justifiably relied and thus constituted a “search
and seizure” within the Fourth Amendment, and the fact that the electronic device employed
to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth had no constitutional
significance).
211. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989) (determining that an
expectation of privacy from aerial observation by helicopters legally within the airspace
above one’s partially open-roof greenhouse is unreasonable); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 215 (1986) (determining that an expectation of privacy from aerial observation of one’s
fenced-in yard is unreasonable); Knotts v. United States, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983)
(determining that monitoring beeper signals did not invade any legitimate expectation of
privacy and, thus, was not a search or seizure); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736, 745–
46 (1979) (using a pen register to record the numbers dialed by a phone did not invade any
legitimate expectation of privacy and, thus, was not a search and no warrant was required).
212. 460 U.S. 276, 278, 285 (1983).
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merely enhanced the police officers’ senses.213 After all, the defendant
appeared on public highways, in open view to members of the public.214
The latter point—that a person knowingly reveals information to
members of the public—was a pivotal argument in subsequent cases. Thus,
when a suspect makes a phone call from his home phone, he reveals
information to his phone company.215 If police then gain access to that same
information, the suspect cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy
because he already knowingly exposed the information to a third party.216
Beginning in 2012, the Court confronted the reality that technology has
changed since the 1980s.217 In United States v. Jones, the government
tracked the defendant’s car for twenty-eight days by attaching a GPS
tracking device to the vehicle.218 The device relayed two thousand pages of
information about Jones’ movements.219 The government argued that the
federal agents’ conduct was not a search, largely in reliance on the Court’s
earlier holding in Knotts.220 During oral argument, some of the questions
and answers focused on that issue: how were the facts different from those

213. See id. at 282.
214. See id. (reasoning that a person travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares
has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another); see
also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 709, 720 (1984) (reasoning that where monitoring
of beeper revealed nothing about contents of locker that two respondents had rented, there
was no “search” of that locker, which was identified only when agents traversing public
parts of facility found that smell of ether was coming from specific locker); Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (“Where . . . the Government uses a device that is not in
general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.”). Notice that the holding in Kyllo left open another
knowing exposure to the public exception wherein a search would not be found if the
technology at issue was in public use or the heightened technology was not needed to
discover the contents of the home.
215. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979) (holding that installation and
use of a pen register by a telephone company does not constitute a “search” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
216. See id. at 745–46.
217. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring)
(discussing how to apply the Fourth Amendment analysis to cover changing and evolving
technology).
218. Id. at 403.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 408–09.
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in Knotts?221 If following a suspect’s vehicle via a beeper is not a search,
how can it be a search in Jones?222 Would the agents’ conduct become a
search on the second day, the third day or sometime thereafter?223
The Jones Court was unanimous in finding for the defendant: the agents’
conduct was a search.224 The five-justice majority found that the federal
agents physically trespassed by attaching the GPS device to the car.225 By
resolving the case via physical trespass, the Court sidestepped the harder
question: when does the government’s conduct cross the threshold from
mere observation to a Fourth Amendment search?226 Justice Alito, writing
for four justices, would have found for Jones on reasonable expectation of
privacy grounds.227 He recognized that dramatic changes in technology
present hard questions for the Court under its Katz expectation of privacy
analysis.228 He also suggested that short-term monitoring, as in Knotts, was
221. United States v. Jones, OYEZ, https://www.oyez.org/cases/2011/10-1259 (last visited
Sept. 16, 2020).
222. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 408–09 (distinguishing the facts of Knotts from those at
issue).
223. See id. at 412 (“What of a 2–day monitoring of a suspected purveyor of stolen
electronics? Or of a 6–month monitoring of a suspected terrorist? We may have to grapple
with these ‘vexing problems’ in some future case where a classic trespassory search is not
involved.”). See generally Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111
MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012).
224. Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (majority opinion); id. at 414 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id.
at 431 (Alito, J., concurring).
225. Id. at 404–05 (majority opinion).
226. See id. at 412 (“It may be that achieving the same result through electronic means,
without an accompanying trespass, is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present
case does not require us to answer that question.”).
227. Id. at 419 (Alito, J., concurring) (“I would analyze the question presented in this
case by asking whether respondent’s reasonable expectations of privacy were violated by the
long-term monitoring of the movements of the vehicle he drove.”).
228. Id. at 427 (“The Katz expectation-of-privacy test avoids the problems and
complications noted above, but it is not without its own difficulties. It involves a degree of
circularity, and judges are apt to confuse their own expectations of privacy with those of the
hypothetical reasonable person to which the Katz test looks. In addition, the Katz test rests
on the assumption that this hypothetical reasonable person has a well-developed and stable
set of privacy expectations. But technology can change those expectations. Dramatic
technological change may lead to periods in which popular expectations are in flux and may
ultimately produce significant changes in popular attitudes. New technology may provide
increased convenience or security at the expense of privacy, and many people may find the
tradeoff worthwhile. And even if the public does not welcome the diminution of privacy that
new technology entails, they may eventually reconcile themselves to this development as
inevitable.”) (citations omitted) (footnote omitted); id. at 430 (“To date, however, Congress
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not a search, but that he would have considered longer term GPS
monitoring as constituting a search.229 Given that the government
monitored Jones for four weeks, Alito concluded that this surveillance
crossed the line and became a Fourth Amendment search.230 Only Justice
Sotomayor, concurring in judgement to give Scalia a fifth vote, suggested
that even short-term GPS monitoring might violate the “existence of a
reasonable societal expectation of privacy.”231
Similarly, the Court narrowed its search-incident-to-lawful-arrest
doctrine in light of developing technology.232 In Riley v. California, a
nearly unanimous Court found that an officer who finds a person’s cell
phone (even a flip-phone) may not look for evidence in the phone incident
to that arrest.233 Lower courts that had previously upheld such searches
analogized the cell phone to a package, like the crumpled-up cigarette
package found on the suspect in United States v. Robinson.234 The Court,
however, recognized how profoundly different a cell phone is from other
kinds of packages.235
and most States have not enacted statutes regulating the use of GPS tracking technology for
law enforcement purposes. The best that we can do in this case is to apply existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case
involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated.”).
229. Id. at 430 (“Under this approach, relatively short-term monitoring of a person’s
movements on public streets accords with expectations of privacy that our society has
recognized as reasonable. But the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of
most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”) (citation omitted).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 415, 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“In cases involving even short-term
monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will
require particular attention. GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a
person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations.”) (citation omitted).
232. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014) (“These cases require us to
decide how the search incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern cell phones, which are
now such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars
might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.”).
233. Id. at 403.
234. See, e.g., United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 259–60 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing
Robinson for the proposition that “[t]he permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful
arrest extends to containers found on the arrestee’s person”).
235. Riley, 573 U.S. at 387, 388–91 (discussing in depth the differences between cell
phones and other packages, especially noting that under the search-incident-to-arrest
exception, interest in protecting police officers’ safety does not justify dispensing with
warrant requirement before officers can search digital data on arrestees’ cell phones because
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Finally, in Carpenter v. United States, modern technology again changed
the way the Court conducted its Fourth Amendment analysis.236 There, after
the arrest of suspected robbers, prosecutors had petitioned the lower court
for an order to obtain cell phone records for the petitioner.237 On review, the
Supreme Court held that a person has a justifiable expectation of privacy in
data that reveals such “detailed” and “encyclopedic” information about
one’s activities.238 Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that the Court’s
decision was a narrow one, leaving open several related questions.239
One might explain Jones, Riley, and Carpenter as merely technology
cases, not a signal of the Court’s general willingness to rethink its War on
Drugs era Fourth Amendment case law. However, Gant is not the only case
that suggests a broader willingness to rethink those cases. In Florida v.
Jardines, for example, the police attempted to corroborate a tip that the
defendant was growing marijuana in his home.240 Officers did so by taking
a drug-sniffing dog to the defendant’s home.241 The dog signaled the
presence of marijuana.242 After the dog’s signaling, one of the detectives
applied for, and received, a search warrant that led to the discovery and
seizure of marijuana in the defendant’s home.243
Had the Court wanted to rely on War on Drugs case law, it could have
found for the state. In one case after another, the Court had previously
found that a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when
members of the public have access to information claimed to be private.244
digital data stored on phones could not itself be used as weapon to harm officers or to
effectuate arrestees’ escape).
236. See 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217, 2223 (2018) (reasoning that a person does not surrender
all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public sphere, and to the contrary,
what one seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected).
237. Id. at 2212.
238. Id. at 2216, 2223.
239. Id. at 2220.
240. 569 U.S. 1, 3–4 (2013).
241. Id.
242. Id. at 4.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41–42 (1988); Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 182–83 (1984); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983);
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979). Remember Ciraolo, where the Court
found that police did not conduct a search after they developed a view of the defendant’s
fenced-in backyard from the vantage of a small airplane because “[a]ny member of the
[flying] public” would have the same view. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
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As such, in Jardines, the Court might easily have found, based on its War
on Drugs cases, that exposing the defendant’s home to a dog sniff was not a
search.245 Nevertheless, writing for five justices, Justice Scalia found that
the police conduct amounted to a trespass, thereby implicating the Fourth
Amendment.246 While also joining Justice Scalia in judgment, Justices
Kagan, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor found that the conduct amounted to a
search under its traditional Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
analysis.247
The Court did not care that a person in flight might lack the incentive to look closely at
activity in the defendant’s backyard—as opposed to the police, who carefully scrutinized
activity in the defendant’s curtilage. See id. at 213–14 (“Any member of the public flying in
this airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed. On
this record, we readily conclude that respondent’s expectation that his garden was protected
from such observation is unreasonable and is not an expectation that society is prepared to
honor.”) (footnote omitted)); see also id. at 224–25 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“But the Court
fails to acknowledge the qualitative difference between police surveillance and other uses
made of the airspace. Members of the public use the airspace for travel, business, or
pleasure, not for the purpose of observing activities taking place within residential yards.
Here, police conducted an overflight at low altitude solely for the purpose of discovering
evidence of crime within a private enclave into which they were constitutionally forbidden
to intrude at ground level without a warrant. It is not easy to believe that our society is
prepared to force individuals to bear the risk of this type of warrantless police intrusion into
their residential areas.”) (footnote omitted).
245. See 569 U.S. at 10–11 (“[T]he Government argued that the Katz standard ‘show[ed]
that no search occurred,’ as the defendant had ‘no “reasonable expectation of privacy”’ in
his whereabouts on the public roads—a proposition with at least as much support in our case
law as the one the State marshals here.”) (citations omitted)); id. at 17 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(“The Court’s decision is also inconsistent with the reasonable-expectations-of-privacy test
that the Court adopted in Katz . . . . A reasonable person understands that odors emanating
from a house may be detected from locations that are open to the public, and a reasonable
person will not count on the strength of those odors remaining within the range that, while
detectible by a dog, cannot be smelled by a human. For these reasons, I would hold that no
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment took place in this case, and I would
reverse the decision below.”).
246. See id. at 3–4, 11–12 (holding that law enforcement officers’ use of drug-sniffing
dog on front porch of home to investigate an unverified tip that marijuana was being grown
in the home was a trespassory invasion of the curtilage which constituted a “search” for
Fourth Amendment purposes).
247. Id. at 12 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“A stranger comes to the front door of your home
carrying super-high-powered binoculars. He doesn’t knock or say hello. Instead, he stands
on the porch and uses the binoculars to peer through your windows, into your home’s
furthest corners. It doesn’t take long (the binoculars are really very fine): In just a couple of
minutes, his uncommon behavior allows him to learn details of your life you disclose to no
one. Has your ‘visitor’ trespassed on your property, exceeding the license you have granted
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Perhaps not surprisingly, all these cases, except Carpenter, involved
drugs. Obviously, technology poses difficult challenges for the Court.
However, they can be read more broadly than simply rethinking the Court’s
technology approach. The decisions seem to demonstrate a willingness to
reevaluate the Court’s War on Drugs Fourth Amendment case law and a
willingness to reinvigorate Fourth Amendment protection.
Constitutional history does not move in one direction. One can find
examples in the past when the Court’s Fourth Amendment case law has
waxed and waned.248 Often, such movement correlates with changing
public attitudes.249 At times, historical trends have led to liberalized
rulings.250 Almost certainly, the Warren Court justices were acutely aware
of the Nazi and Soviet experiences where police routinely violated human
rights.251 Such concerns influenced the Court towards expanding basic
protections.252 Of course, public opinion works in the opposite direction as
well. For example, the public perception that the Warren Court’s liberal
rulings increased crime helped lead to Richard Nixon’s victory in 1968,253
and his addition of four new Justices in two years helped erode many of
those protections.254 Similarly, public panic about drugs in the 1980s led to
diminished Fourth Amendment protection for criminal defendants.255 We
are now at another crossroads.
to members of the public to, say, drop off the mail or distribute campaign flyers? Yes, he
has. And has he also invaded your ‘reasonable expectation of privacy,’ by nosing into
intimacies you sensibly thought protected from disclosure? Yes, of course, he has done that
too.”) (citations omitted)).
248. See Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
820, 841–44 (1994) (discussing shifting attitudes about Fourth Amendment rights).
249. See id. at 843 (discussing connection between civil rights movement and Fourth
Amendment case law).
250. See id.
251. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (reasoning that due process
encompasses an evolving set of fundamental rights that changes with the advancing
standards of a free society but that nevertheless there is no question that the right to privacy
and freedom from its arbitrary invasion by federal or state police is fundamental). For a
discussion of how the public revelation of the Nazi atrocities influenced the Supreme Court,
see Steiker, supra note 248, at 842–43 (discussing Nuremberg’s influence on Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence).
252. See Steiker, supra note 248, at 843–44.
253. See BAKER, supra note 58, at 243–49.
254. See Michael Vitiello, The Warren Court’s Eyewitness Identification Case Law:
What If?, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 867, 874–75 (2020).
255. See id. at 868–69.
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Below, this Article discusses some issues that have arisen in states where
medical and/or recreational marijuana are lawful.256 As developed there, I
see a willingness to expand Fourth Amendment protection.257 However, a
few state courts are reexamining earlier precedent.258 Does this begin a new
era in which courts will reclaim Fourth Amendment protections? As
developed below, I believe so.259
IV. Legalized Marijuana and Probable Cause,
Drug-Sniffing Dogs, and Helicopters
A. Legal Marijuana and Probable Cause
Assume that a person lives in a state that has legalized the medical and/or
recreational use of marijuana. Assume further that an officer encounters
that individual and observes the person using marijuana. Does the officer
have probable cause to arrest the individual or to search the person’s
immediate area?
One scholar has summarized the law generally without reference to
legalization:
[A]t least at the Supreme Court level, marijuana has played a
central role in cases where probable cause or reasonable
suspicion was based at least in part on an officer’s “plain smell.”
And lower court cases show that officers continue to find it easy
to detect the presence of marijuana while engaged in other
lawful investigative enterprises. Police in search-and-seizure
cases claim to have smelled burned or burning marijuana,
unburned marijuana, and the odor of marijuana lingering on a
subject’s clothing.260
Should the same rules apply post-legalization?
Early case law said yes, almost universally. People v. Strasburg, decided
by a middle appellate court in California, is a typical example of this
application.261 The facts in the case are convoluted. The essential facts,
256. See infra Part IV.
257. See infra Part IV.
258. See infra Part IV.
259. See infra Part IV.
260. Mandiberg, supra note 1, at 39–41.
261. 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 306, 308 (Ct. App. 2007) (holding that defendant’s prescription for
medical marijuana did not deprive officer of a basis to detain or frisk defendant).
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however, are as follows: a Napa police officer approached a car in which
Strasburg and another person were sitting.262 As he did so, the defendant
opened his car door.263 The officer smelled marijuana.264 The defendant
admitted that he possessed cannabis but tried to show the officer his
medical marijuana authorization card.265 The officer refused to look at the
card.266
The encounter between the officer and the defendant escalated,267 as such
incidents often do. The officer ended up ordering the defendant out of the
car.268 An ensuing search resulted in the discovery of twenty-three ounces
of marijuana and a scale.269 The appellate court, upholding the police
conduct, agreed with the trial court’s finding that “once an officer smells
marijuana coming from a car that officer can search the car for
marijuana.”270 The defendant did not present “any authority that possessing
a medical marijuana card deprives the officer of the right to continue with
that investigation.”271 Rephrased, the officer had probable cause to believe
that the suspect, even with a marijuana card, was violating state law.
Such a ruling was consistent with cases in other states.272
The Supreme Court of Arizona, for example, emphasized the
fact that its medical marijuana law “did not decriminalize the
possession or use of marijuana generally” and instead “makes
marijuana legal in only limited circumstances.” In reaching the
same conclusion, the Michigan Court of Appeals noted that its
state’s medical marijuana law was a “very limited, highly
restricted exception to the statutory proscription against the
manufacture and use of marijuana in Michigan.” . . . .

262. Id. at 307.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 307–08.
266. Id. at 308.
267. See id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. See Alex Kreit, Marijuana Legalization and Pretextual Stops, 50 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 741, 761–62 (2016) (explaining that states with medical marijuana statutes, such as
Arizona, Michigan, and New Jersey, have all held that possession of illegal marijuana can
still be probable cause for a search).
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. . . The Vermont Supreme Court . . . found the odds that the
“odor of fresh marijuana” may be coming from legally possessed
medical marijuana to be a “small possibility,” insufficient to
“negate the State’s probable cause to search . . . .”273
The Supreme Court’s rather low bar for probable cause could be
interpreted to support the results reached in California, Arizona, and
Michigan. The Court has found that “innocent behavior frequently will
provide the basis for . . . probable cause.”274 The Fourth Amendment’s
probable cause standard “requires only a probability or substantial chance
of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.”275 Even if the
Supreme Court demanded stronger support for a probable cause finding, it
would still be likely that—especially in the early days of medical
marijuana—most marijuana users were not medical marijuana users.276
Hence, as a matter of probabilities, an officer observing someone smoking
marijuana would likely be correct in believing that the marijuana user was
violating state law.
For many years, Massachusetts was an outlier. Because possession of
one ounce or less of marijuana was merely a civil offense after 2008, the
state’s highest court held that an officer could not even formulate
reasonable suspicion when he observed a suspect in possession of
marijuana.277 Unlike the California appellate court’s approach, the
Massachusetts court found that the odor of burnt marijuana did not create
273. Id. (footnotes omitted) (first quoting State v. Sisco, 373 P.3d 549, 553 (Ariz. 2016);
then quoting People v. Brown, 825 N.W.2d 91, 94 (Mich. Ct. App. 2012); and then quoting
State v. Senna, 79 A.3d 45, 50 (Vt. 2013)).
274. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13 (1983) (emphasis added).
275. Kreit, supra note 272, at 760–61 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243 n.13
(1983)).
276. Although the numbers may vary from state to state, recent empirical evidence
supports this assumption. See, e.g., Rosalie Liccardo Pacula, Mireille Jacobson & Ervant J.
Maksabedian, In the Weeds: A Baseline View of Cannabis Use Among Legalizing States and
Their Neighbours, 111 ADDICTION 973, 975 (2016) (surveying marijuana use patterns in
Colorado, Washington, Oregon, and New Mexico and finding that recreational marijuana
use is higher than medical marijuana use in all four states).
277. See Commonwealth v. Cruz, 945 N.E.2d 899, 905 (Mass. 2011) (holding that in
light of statute decriminalizing possession of less than one ounce of marijuana, the odor of
burnt marijuana that police officers detected from validly stopped vehicle did not, when
combined with other factors, give rise to a reasonable suspicion that defendant, a passenger
in that car, was engaged in criminal activity so as to justify an order to defendant to exit
vehicle).
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justification to search a vehicle.278 The state’s initiative made an ounce or
less a civil violation, not a crime. As a result, merely smelling marijuana
did not demonstrate “that a criminal amount of contraband was present in
the car.”279
Does anything change with the legalization of recreational marijuana?
Recently, a California District Court of Appeal said yes.280 In People v. Lee,
which involved a complex fact pattern, two officers approached a parked
car and observed the defendant and another person in the vehicle.281 The
officers learned that the defendant had marijuana on his person, and the
defendant indicated that he delivered medical marijuana.282 The officers
also learned that the defendant was driving with a suspended license.283 The
officers told the defendant that the police were going to impound his car.284
They continued to look inside the vehicle, eventually finding a handgun,
fifty-six grams of cocaine and other evidence.285 Charged with possession
of cocaine not for personal use while armed, the defendant successfully
moved to suppress the evidence.286
The state argued, inter alia, that finding the defendant in possession of
marijuana justified the search of the vehicle.287 Unlike the Strasburg court,
which found that a medical marijuana card alone did not negate the
reasonableness of a search, the Lee court, in effect, rejected a bright-line
rule.288 Possession of marijuana alone did not create probable cause for a
continued search.289 As summarized by the court:
[T]here must be evidence—that is, additional evidence beyond
the mere possession of a legal amount—that would cause a
reasonable person to believe the defendant has more marijuana.
And it would be incorrect to say that California’s legalization of
278. Id. at 908.
279. Id. at 913.
280. People v. Lee, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 512, 521–22 (Ct. App. 2019) (explaining that the
legalization of marijuana affects the court’s analysis of whether there was probable cause to
search defendant’s vehicle).
281. Id. at 516–17.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 517.
286. Id. at 517–18.
287. Id. at 519–20.
288. See id.
289. Id.
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marijuana is of no relevance in assessing whether there is
probable cause to search a vehicle in which police find a small
and legal amount of the drug. To understand the significance of
California’s legalization of marijuana to the suppression motion
here, we must construe the relevant cases in their historical
context.290

Consistent with Lee, an officer’s knowledge that a suspect has marijuana
may be relevant. But unlike Strasburg, it does not alone create probable
cause.291
To date, only one court has cited Lee.292 While it did so largely in
agreement with the court’s holding,293 one can no doubt imagine
counterarguments.294 Prosecutors in California (and elsewhere, if other
recreational marijuana states arrive at the same conclusion as does Lee)
may challenge the court’s Fourth Amendment analysis. For the first time in
decades, Democratic appointees are now a majority on the state’s highest
court.295 Although it is a bit of an oversimplification, a more liberal
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See United States v. Maffei, 417 F. Supp. 3d 1212, 1225 (N.D. Cal. 2019).
293. See id. at 1220, 1221–22, 1226–27, 1232–33 (holding that: (1) defendant was seized
under the Fourth Amendment from the time of officer’s traffic stop of vehicle that she was a
passenger of through the duration of the stop; (2) officer’s request for license of defendant,
who was the passenger in vehicle, did not materially prolong the stop; (3) officer
unreasonably prolonged the otherwise reasonable seizure of the vehicle by conducting a
record check of defendant; (4) officer did not have probable cause to believe that vehicle
contained contraband to support a search under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement; (5) broken taillight on vehicle did not justify the impoundment of the vehicle
under the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement; (6) search warrant for
defendant’s home was not supported by probable cause, and therefore valid warrant
exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence found during the search; and (7)
constitutional error regarding search was made by the officer of the case rather than the
magistrate, and therefore good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply).
294. For example, it is very likely that a Californian in possession of marijuana is still in
violation of the law. More than two years after the rollout of Proposition 64, which legalized
marijuana, the best estimate is that spending on illicit marijuana is almost three times as high
as that on legal marijuana. ARCVIEW MKT. RES. & BDS ANALYTICS, CALIFORNIA: LESSONS
FROM THE WORLD’S LARGEST CANNABIS MARKET: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 6 (2019),
https://bdsa.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/2019_BDS_California_CIB_Exec_Summ_
Final_With_A.pdf.
295. Justices, CAL. CTS., https://www.courts.ca.gov/3014.htm (last visited Sept. 17,
2020) (listing the current makeup of the California Supreme Court).
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California Supreme Court may follow suit in strengthening Fourth
Amendment protection surrounding marijuana possession.296
Would the United States Supreme Court follow suit as well? The Court
typically waits for lower courts to weigh in on legal issues.297 Especially
considering the cases that I discuss below,298 state courts may be ready for a
more expansive Fourth Amendment as well. A consensus among lower
courts might influence the Supreme Court. In addition, as I argued above,
the Supreme Court has signaled a willingness to rethink its War on Drugs
Fourth Amendment case law.299
B. Drug-Sniffing Dogs
As discussed above, early in the War on Drugs, the Court handed police
a powerful tool when it held that exposing personal items to a drug-sniffing
dog was not a search.300 The Court extended that holding in Illinois v.
Caballes.301 There, the Court found that Place’s dicta applied when an
officer exposed a person’s vehicle to a drug-sniffing dog.302
In Place, in dicta, the Court indicated that the dog-sniff was not a search
because it revealed only the presence or absence of contraband.303 Under
the Katz formulation defining a “search,” a person has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the possession of contraband.304
296. See generally GABRIEL WEINBERGER, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND MORE
LENIENT DRUG POLICY (2019) (identifying various sentencing reforms and more liberal drug
policies supported largely by Democrats, often with little or no support from Republicans).
297. Deena Shanker, The U.S. Supreme Court Decides Less Than Half as Many Cases as
It Did 40 Years Ago—and That’s Just Fine, QUARTZ (July 5, 2015), https://qz.com/
443100/supreme-court-decisions/ (“[T]he justices are waiting for critical masses of lower
courts to rule on [issues] before weighing in.”).
298. See infra Sections IV.C.–D.
299. See supra Parts II–III.
300. See supra Section II.C.
301. 543 U.S. 405, 406, 409–10 (2005) (holding that where lawful traffic stop was not
extended beyond time necessary to issue warning ticket and to conduct ordinary inquiries
incident to such a stop, another officer’s arrival at scene while stop was in progress and use
of narcotics-detection dog to sniff around exterior of motorist’s vehicle did not rise to level
of cognizable infringement on motorist’s Fourth Amendment rights).
302. Id. at 409.
303. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that exposure of
luggage to a trained narcotics detection dog is not a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes).
304. See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408–09 (reasoning under the Katz formulation of privacy
that “possessing contraband cannot be deemed ‘legitimate,’ and thus, governmental conduct
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Many, including some members of the Court, have questioned this
conclusion.305 Importantly, the Court seemed to believe erroneously in the
infallibility of drug-sniffing dogs.306 Data emerged suggesting frequent
false positives.307 The dog-sniff allows a search of one’s personal
possessions. When the dog is wrong, the police have been able to examine
personal effects in which one might have a legitimate expectation of
privacy.308

that only reveals the possession of contraband ‘compromises no legitimate privacy interest.’
This is because the expectation ‘that certain facts will not come to the attention of the
authorities’ is not the same as an interest in ‘privacy that society is prepared to consider
reasonable.’”) (citations omitted).
305. See, e.g., id. at 411–12 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“The infallible dog, however, is a
creature of legal fiction. Although the Supreme Court of Illinois did not get into the sniffing
averages of drug dogs, their supposed infallibility is belied by judicial opinions describing
well-trained animals sniffing and alerting with less than perfect accuracy, whether owing to
errors by their handlers, the limitations of the dogs themselves, or even the pervasive
contamination of currency by cocaine. . . . Indeed, a study cited by Illinois in this case for
the proposition that dog sniffs are ‘generally reliable’ shows that dogs in artificial testing
situations return false positives anywhere from 12.5% to 60% of the time, depending on the
length of the search.” (citing Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)
(No. 03-923))); KELLY J. GARNER ET AL., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., DUTY CYCLE OF THE
DETECTOR DOG: A BASELINE STUDY 12 (Apr. 2001) (prepared by Auburn University
Institute for Biological Detection Systems). “In practical terms, the evidence is clear that the
dog that alerts hundreds of times will be wrong dozens of times.” Id. at 412; see also United
States v. Bentley, 795 F.3d 630, 635 (5th Cir. 2015) (“[A]n alert from an adequately trained
and reliable drug detection dog is sufficient to give rise to a finding of probable cause.”);
Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 767 (Fla. 2011) (holding that fact that drug-detection dog has
been trained and certified to detect narcotics, standing alone, is not sufficient to demonstrate
reliability of dog for purposes of determining probable cause for search), withdrawn, 123 So.
3d 1144, 1144 (Fla. 2013) (per curiam); United States v. Florez, 871 F. Supp. 1411, 1424
(D.N.M. 1994) (holding that an alert by a trained narcotics dog provides probable cause only
if reliability of dog is shown and that in the absence of records concerning dog’s alerts,
dog’s alert is insufficient to establish probable cause).
306. See, e.g., Caballes, 543 U.S. at 411–12 (Souter, J., dissenting).
307. See id. at 412 (citing Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13, Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005)
(No. 03-923)); GARNER ET AL., supra note 305, at 12; see also Bentley, 795 F.3d at 635
(noting that the drug-sniffing dog’s field accuracy “is not much better than a coin flip”).
308. Assume, as is often the case considering data cited above, that a drug-sniffing dog
gives a false positive. That creates probable cause, allowing police to search a person’s
possessions. One can easily imagine personal items, lawful to possess, that a person might
not want to reveal to the police or to anyone else for that matter.
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Early commentators also rarely discussed the causes for poor
performance by drug-sniffing dogs.309 Training varies widely.310 A common
practice is for a trainer to reward the dog only upon signaling the presence
of drugs,311 which may encourage drug-sniffing dogs to signal the presence
of drugs in close cases. Further, dog handlers seldom train dogs to signal
only significant amounts of drugs (any amount is sufficient).312 The reality,
then, is that the police may develop probable cause to search or to arrest an
individual based on a bad “tip” by a poorly trained K-9 animal, or the
animal could detect a legal amount of marijuana that should not give rise to
probable cause in states where marijuana is legal in certain amounts.313
Because a dog-sniff is not Fourth Amendment activity, police need no
threshold showing of any kind to expose the person’s personal items to a
dog-sniff, even though the individual’s life may be disrupted based on bad
information.314
Not surprisingly, some lower courts have attempted to impose additional
requirements to limit the use of drug-sniffing dogs.315 A unanimous
Supreme Court rejected Florida’s highest court’s efforts to impose a multifactored test when police relied on a drug-sniffing dog’s signal.316 The

309. See GARNER ET AL., supra note 305, at 12 (showing false-positive rates based on
length of search).
310. For examples of various K-9 dog training programs, see generally RESI GERRISTEN
& RUUD HAAK, K9 PROFESSIONAL TRACKING: A COMPLETE MANUAL FOR THEORY AND
TRAINING (2001); K9TS Training Solutions, K9TS, https://www.k9ts.org/ (last visited Sept.
17, 2020); K9 TRAINING: DOG TRAINING PROFS., http://k9training.us/ (last visited Sept. 17,
2020); K-9 Program, CAL. DEP’T FISH & WILDLIFE, https://wildlife.ca.gov/
Enforcement/K9 (last visited Sept. 17, 2020).
311. See, e.g., GARNER ET AL., supra note 305, at 6 (explaining that dogs in the study
were rewarded for correct alerts).
312. See id. at 3–4 (evaluating ability to detect odor without consideration to quantity of
odorous substance).
313. See infra notes 326–31.
314. See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining
that the Court has held that “the sniff of the narcotics-seeking dog [is] ‘sui generis’ under the
Fourth Amendment and . . . [is] not a search”).
315. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 71 So. 3d 756, 767 (Fla. 2011) (holding that the fact that a
drug-detection dog has been trained and certified to detect narcotics, standing alone, is not
sufficient to demonstrate the reliability of the dog for purposes of determining probable
cause for a search).
316. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 240, 248 (2013) (holding that Florida Supreme
Court did not apply “‘flexible, common-sense standard’ of probable cause” in determining
reliability of drug detection dog, and that the dog’s reliability was established (quoting
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Supreme Court indicated that a dog’s past performance may be a relevant
factor to an overall assessment of probable cause, but that it is not
determinative.317
The Colorado Supreme Court’s 2019 decision in People v. McKnight,
however, suggests that some courts are ready to cut back on the Supreme
Court’s doctrine.318 In McKnight, a police officer stopped the defendant’s
truck for a traffic violation.319 During the stop, the officer requested a K-9
unit.320 The drug-sniffing dog signaled the presence of one of the
substances he had been trained to identify in the defendant’s truck.321
Subsequently, police searched the defendant’s vehicle and discovered a
residue-encrusted methamphetamine pipe.322 Thereafter, the defendant was
arrested.323 Important to the court’s decision was the fact that the dog was
trained to signal the presence of methamphetamines, cocaine, heroin,
ecstasy, and marijuana, no matter the amount of marijuana or other drugs
present.324
The court framed the issue with precision:
[T]he possession of an ounce or less of marijuana by someone
twenty-one or older is legal in Colorado, following the passage
of Amendment 64, Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16(3), even though
such possession remains illegal under federal law. Thus, no
matter how reliable his nose, Kilo [the drug-sniffing dog] can
now render a kind of false positive for marijuana. He has been
trained to alert to marijuana based on the notion that marijuana is
always contraband, when that is no longer true under state law.
And historically, whether a drug-detection dog might alert on
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983))); see id. at 248 (rejecting Florida’s totality test,
which largely focused on the dog’s past performance in the field).
317. See id. at 245 (“[T]he decision below treats records of a dog’s field performance as
the gold standard in evidence, when in most cases they have relatively limited import.”).
318. 446 P.3d 397, 410, 413 (Colo. 2019) (holding that: (1) a sniff from a dog trained to
detect marijuana is a “search” under the State Constitution and “must be justified by some
degree of suspicion of criminal activity”; (2) a warrantless sniff of automobile by dog trained
to detect marijuana was not justified; and (3) “exclusion is the appropriate remedy for this
type of constitutional violation”).
319. Id. at 400.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. See id.
324. Id. at 406.
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noncontraband drives whether the dog’s sniff constitutes a
search implicating constitutional protections. The dog’s sniff
arguably intrudes on a person’s reasonable expectation of
privacy in lawful activity. If so, that intrusion must be justified
by some degree of particularized suspicion of criminal
activity.325

Application of Supreme Court precedent would have ended the
discussion quickly: a dog-sniff is not a search because it reveals only the
presence or absence of contraband.326 Exposure of the vehicle was
constitutional if the dog-sniff occurred within the time needed to process a
ticket for the traffic offense.327 Instead, the Colorado Supreme Court relied
on its state constitutional provision to find for the defendant.328
When the Supreme Court decided United States v. Place, a dog—assuming
reliability—revealed only illegal activity.329 An offender could not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in contraband.330 Not so in Colorado any
longer: the dog’s alert could signal activity entirely legal under state law.331
A court, however, could arrive at the opposite conclusion. In McKnight,
the court could have instead adopted the state’s argument: all use of
marijuana violates federal law.332 Hence, one cannot have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in any amount of marijuana—even if it is legal under
state law—because all marijuana is contraband federally. The Colorado
325. Id.
326. Id. at 405; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (determining
that a dog sniff is not a search under the Fourth Amendment because it reveals limited
information, namely, “only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item”).
327. McKnight, 446 P.3d at 405.
328. Id. at 399.
329. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (explaining that a dog sniff “does not expose
noncontraband items”).
330. Id.
331. McKnight, 446 P.3d at 399 (noting that while the dog sniff would have been
constitutional had the sniff only detected the presence or absence of contraband, the dog in
this case was “trained to alert to marijuana based on the notion that marijuana is always
contraband, when that is no longer true under state law. And historically, whether a drugdetection dog might alert on noncontraband drives whether the dog’s sniff constitutes a
search implicating constitutional protections. The dog’s sniff arguably intrudes on a person’s
reasonable expectation of privacy in lawful activity. If so, that intrusion must be justified by
some degree of particularized suspicion of criminal activity.”).
332. Id. at 406 (acknowledging that because marijuana remains contraband under federal
law, the dog’s sniff is arguably not a search under the U.S. Supreme Court’s Caballes
decision).
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court’s rejection of the state’s argument, however, demonstrates a new
attitude in the post-War on Drugs era.333 Further, it advances significant
privacy interests. Even today, when most Americans live in states where
some form of marijuana is legal,334 police still make thousands of
marijuana-related arrests.335 A marijuana arrest may lead to a conviction
with any number of consequences. Such arrests are disruptive even if they
do not lead to criminal convictions or to jail time.336 They can lead to lost
time at work, with the possible loss of a job.337 Even a civil marijuana
violation—not a misdemeanor—may incur fines and fees, leading some
offenders to borrow those funds from a high-interest lender.338 As many
Americans learned in the aftermath of the Michael Brown shooting,
numerous municipalities fund their budgets in large part with fines and fees
imposed on their poorer communities.339 McKnight reduces the number of
such arrests.340
Consistent with the theme of this Article, McKnight provides more
evidence that courts are reclaiming Fourth Amendment protection.
However, because the McKnight court relied on the state constitution, the
state cannot seek review in the Supreme Court.341 As part of a larger
mosaic, McKnight may signal to the Supreme Court an emerging consensus
in favor of more vigorous Fourth Amendment protection at least in
marijuana cases.

333. See id. at 410 (“Because a sniff from a dog trained to detect marijuana (in addition
to other substances) can reveal lawful activity, . . . that sniff is a search under article II,
section 7 and must be justified by some degree of suspicion of criminal activity.”).
334. See Sarah Rense, Here Are All the States That Have Legalized Weed in the U.S.,
ESQUIRE (Feb. 7, 2020), https://www.esquire.com/lifestyle/a21719186/all-states-thatlegalized-weed-in-us/.
335. See Vitiello, supra note 13, at 808 (observing that marijuana-related arrests of black
and Latino youths have increased).
336. Id. at 806–07.
337. Id.
338. See id.
339. See Walter Johnson, Ferguson’s Fortune 500 Company: Why the Missouri City—
Despite Hosting a Multinational Corporation—Relied on Municipal Fees and Fines to
Extract Revenue from Its Poorest Residents, ATLANTIC (Apr. 26, 2015), https://www.
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/fergusons-fortune-500-company/390492/.
340. Insofar as the state still has a legitimate interest in pursuing other kinds of drug
offenders, the police can find dogs trained to signal for drugs other than marijuana. See
People v. McKnight, 446 P.3d 397, 399 (Colo. 2019).
341. See id. at 410.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol73/iss2/4

2021]

THE RENEWED FOURTH AMENDMENT?

333

C. Overflights and Helicopters
As developed above, during the height of the War on Drugs, the
Supreme Court held that overflights did not amount to Fourth Amendment
searches.342 It did so in cases where defendants grew marijuana within the
curtilage of their homes and made significant efforts to keep their activities
private.343 In Florida v. Riley, the Court was willing to ignore a
homeowner’s extraordinary efforts to keep his activities private.344 Five
justices found that an overflight of a helicopter was not a Fourth
Amendment search.345
Helicopter overflights are no small intrusion as described in cases where
police have observed marijuana growing near defendants’ homes. For
example, in State v. Davis, the defendant was in bed and not well when a
helicopter began hovering right above his home.346 When he went outside,
“[h]e observed the helicopter hovering approximately 50 feet above his
head ‘kicking up dust and debris that was swirling all around.’”347
Other witnesses testified to even more disruption:
Several nearby residents characterized the helicopter flyovers
during Operation Yerba Buena as terrifying and highly
disruptive. Kelly Rayburn watched a helicopter fly around his
house about “half a dozen times.” Rayburn said the helicopter
flew so close to his roof that the downdraft lifted off a solar
panel and scattered trash all over his property. Victoria Lindsay
observed a helicopter sweeping back and forth over her property,
sending debris and personal property all over the yard. Lindsay
also observed the helicopter hovering very close to the ground at
a neighbor’s greenhouse. Merilee Lighty observed a helicopter

342. See supra Section II.C.2.
343. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (describing “a 6-foot outer
fence and a 10-foot inner fence completely enclosing the yard”); see also Florida v. Riley,
488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989) (describing a greenhouse with two of its sides enclosed,
surrounded by trees and shrubs, and covered with roofing panels).
344. See Riley, 488 U.S. at 451–52 (holding that an officer’s observation, with his naked
eye, of interior of partially covered greenhouse in residential backyard from vantage point of
helicopter circling 400 feet above did not constitute a “search” for which a warrant was
required, despite defendant’s efforts to keep his activities private).
345. Id. at 446.
346. 360 P.3d 1161, 1164 (N.M. 2015).
347. Id.
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flying over her property for about 15 minutes. She said it was so
close that the downdraft affected her trees and her bushes.348
Given the narrow majority in the Court’s overflight case law and a
reconsideration of the War on Drugs era cases, litigants have begun to
challenge the Court’s rulings.349 Davis provides a good example of how at
least one state court has dealt with the problem. There, the defendant
challenged the overflight as a search within the meaning of both New
Mexico’s Constitution and the United States Constitution.350 The court of
appeals found that the overflight did not constitute a Fourth Amendment
search, but did amount to a violation of the state constitution.351 The New
Mexico Supreme Court disagreed: it found that the police conduct was both
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and a violation of
state law.352
The Davis court started with the premise that a person may have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the curtilage of one’s home.353
Whether in fact an owner has such an expectation depends on his efforts to
exclude others from viewing activity within the curtilage.354 The court
found that the defendant had made such efforts, for example, by fencing the
area around his home.355 However, fencing alone is not enough to create a
justifiable expectation of privacy if the police gain their aerial observation
in a manner that is not overly intrusive.356 Here, the court focused closely
on statements in Justice White’s plurality opinion in Riley.357 As the New
Mexico Supreme Court read Riley, the police cross the threshold from
observation to search with “a physical disturbance on the ground or
unreasonable interference with a resident’s use of his property.”358 Once an
348. Id.
349. See id. at 1172 (agreeing with Davis that “aerial surveillance over [his] property was
an unwarranted search in violation of the Fourth Amendment”).
350. Id. at 1166.
351. Id.
352. See id. at 1166, 1172 (reasoning that under the “interstitial approach” to
constitutional interpretation where federal and state constitutions provide overlapping
protections, the court first considers whether the right being asserted is protected under the
federal constitution, and if it is, then the state constitution claim is not reached).
353. Id. at 1167.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. See id. at 1167–68 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986)).
357. See id. at 1168–69.
358. Id. at 1169.
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officer crosses that line, “surveillance more closely resembles a physical
invasion of privacy which has always been a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.”359
Intriguingly, the New Mexico court also cited Justice Sotomayor’s
concurring opinion in United States v. Jones.360 There, the Court found that
federal agents committed a trespass when they attached a GPS device to
Jones’s vehicle, which constituted a Fourth Amendment search.361 The
Davis court also canvassed lower court cases that have dealt with the same
issue, including two state cases finding that police conduct amounted to
Fourth Amendment activity.362
Ultimately, the Davis Court found that the police conduct did amount to
a search.363 In theory, the court’s decision lines up with the Supreme
Court’s case law.364 Generally, overflights are not searches but can cross the
line based on a case-by-case analysis.365 Davis is consistent with the overall
thesis of this Article: courts recognize the failure of the War on Drugs and
359. Id. (citations omitted).
360. Id. (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“[A] search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs, at a
minimum, ‘[w]here . . . the Government obtains information by physically intruding on a
constitutionally protected area.’”) (citation omitted)).
361. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404 (incorporating the property-based trespass test articulated
in earlier cases and holding that the warrantless placement of a GPS tracking device on the
undercarriage of an individual’s vehicle in order to track the person’s movements on public
streets constitutes an unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment because a
vehicle is an “effect” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
362. See Davis, 360 P.3d at 1169 (“We do not consider this question in a vacuum. Many
state courts base their determination of whether a particular aerial surveillance violates the
Fourth Amendment on the degree of physical intrusion on the ground below. In assessing
intrusion, courts look at the legality of the flight, the altitude of the aircraft, the frequency
and duration of the flight, and the nature of the area observed—factors similar to Ciraolo
and Riley and factors employed by the district court in this very case.”). See generally id. at
1169–71 (discussing lower court cases dealing with the issue).
363. Id. at 1172 (“Based on the evidence, therefore, we conclude that the official conduct
in this case went beyond a brief flyover to gather information. The prolonged hovering close
enough to the ground to cause interference with Davis’ property transformed this
surveillance from a lawful observation of an area left open to public view to an
unconstitutional intrusion into Davis’ expectation of privacy. We think what happened in
this case to Davis and other persons on the ground is precisely what did not occur in either
Ciraolo or Riley . . . . Accordingly, we hold that the aerial surveillance over Davis’ property
was an unwarranted search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.”).
364. See id. (distinguishing Ciraolo and Riley from Davis).
365. Id. at 1169.
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the erosion of the Fourth Amendment. They are breathing new life into the
Fourth Amendment or analogous state laws. The opinion demonstrates
more concern about expectations of privacy and less concern about aiding
police in the War on Drugs.366 Further, the court grounded its decision on
the Fourth Amendment instead of the safe harbor of the state
constitution.367 Doing so left open the possibility that the state could have
petitioned the Supreme Court for review.368 An increase in cases that
challenge specific facts may lead to the Supreme Court reexamining its case
law.
V. Concluding Thoughts
As argued above, the War on Drugs has diminished Fourth Amendment
protection. Today, Americans across a broad political spectrum seem
exhausted with the war. Perhaps not coincidentally, the Supreme Court
seems willing to rethink some of its Fourth Amendment case law.369 Here, I
have argued that pressure from lower courts may advance that trend.370
Especially in states where voters and legislatures have legalized
marijuana for medical or recreational use, courts seem ready to cut back on
police power.371 The Court’s watered-down Fourth Amendment case law
has allowed police too much power to invade individuals’ privacy interests.
While the Supreme Court sometimes rejects widely adopted views from
lower courts, it often defers to the lower courts.372 Given that the Court
already seems open to rethinking its Fourth Amendment case law,
continued upward pressure from lower courts can help us reclaim our
constitutional protections.

366. See generally id. at 1171 (“[U]nobtrusive aerial observations of space open to the
public are generally permitted under the Fourth Amendment. . . . [But] when low-flying
aerial activity leads to more than just observation and actually causes an unreasonable
intrusion on the ground[,] . . . at some point courts are compelled to step in and require a
warrant . . . .”).
367. Id. at 1172.
368. See id.
369. See supra Part III.
370. See supra Part III.
371. See supra Part IV.
372. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REV.
851, 915–17 (2014) (evaluating the Supreme Court’s practices related to adopting the
reasoning of lower courts).
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